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PRETTY WOMAN MEETS THE MAN WHO WEARS THE STAR:
FAIR USE AFTER CAMPBELL v. ACUFF-ROSE MUSIC AND
AMERICAN GEOPHYSICAL UNION v. TEXACO

by

ANNE

E.

FORKNER,* JAMES

s. HELLER,** AND

PATRICK F. SPEICE***

Federal courts have long struggled interpreting fair use, and little
changed after Congress codified the common law principle in the Copyright Act of 1976. 1 The United States Supreme Court's most recent attempt to clarify how courts should analyze section 107 of the Copyright
Act occurred in 1994 in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music. 2 Soon after
Campbell, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc.,3 holding that the systematic
routing of journal issues to scientists in a private corporation, and the subsequent copying and archiving of articles by the scientists, was not a fair
use. Texaco, and the dozen federal appeals court cases that have cited
both it and Campbell, illustrate the difficulty many courts have interpreting and applying section 107 thirty years after passage of the Act. This
article examines these decisions, shows how far copyright jurisprudence
has strayed from the intent of the Framers of the U.S. Constitution when
they crafted the Copyright Clause,4 and concludes with a recommendation
to amend section 107 in order to have a more cohesive and balanced fair
use jurisprudence.
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technical assistance.
1 17 u.s.c. § 107 (2000).
2 510 u.s. 569 (1994).
3 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
4 U.S. CoNsT. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
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THE HISTORY OF FAIR USE

I.

The English Statute of Anne 5 first codified in law the notion that the
author of a creative work should enjoy a limited period of exclusive rights
to that work- today known as copyright. The Statute's title states clearly
the policy rationale behind it: "An Act for the Encouragement of Learning by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers
of such Copies, during the Times therein mentioned." 6 Stated more explicitly, the Statute was "for the Encouragement of Learned Men to Compose and Write useful Books." 7 Later in the eighteenth century, the
Framers of the U.S. Constitution included a similar provision in the Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution, giving Congress the power "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times, to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries."B
The purposes of both the Statute of Anne and the Copyright Clause
are similar: the creation and dissemination of knowledge. 9 The Copyright
Clause seeks to achieve this goal by granting a limited monopoly to individual authors such that an incentive exists for the authors to realize their
full creative potential, without denying the public the benefit of these creative activities. 10 In short, copyright is a "pragmatic measure by which society confers monopoly-exploitation benefits for a limited duration on
Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
!d. For a more thorough discussion of the origin of the Statute of Anne, see,
e.g., L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF CoPYRIGHT: A LAW OF UsERs' RIGHTS 27-31 (1991); Sharon Appel, Copyright,
Digitization of Images, and Art Museums: Cyberspace and Other New Frontiers Spring, 6 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 149, 154-57 (1999); L. Ray Patterson,
Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REv. 1, 19-33 (1987).
7 Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
s See U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; see also PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note
6, at 47-48.
9 See supra text accompanying notes 6-8; see also PATTERSON & LINDBERG,
supra note 6, at 47-55 (discussing generally the policy rationale of the Copyright Clause).
JO For a survey of authorities that develop this idea, see Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 428-34 (1984) (discussing the
Copyright Clause, early cases, and the legislative history of early copyright
statutes in the United States), succinctly summarizing the purpose and underlying policy rationales of the Copyright Clause:
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather,
the limited grant is a means by which an important public purpose may be
achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and
inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public
access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive
control has expired.
5
6
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authors and artists ... in order to obtain for itself the intellectual and
practical enrichment that results from creative endeavors." 11 Accordingly,
Congress should enact copyright laws that seek to create an optimal balance between the rights of creators on one hand, and on the other, the
benefits to society from creative works.
Such a balance is not easy to establish, however. Congress should
provide adequate incentives to authors, yet not stifle creativity or disable
dissemination of a work, and consequently its benefits, to the public.
Under the Copyright Clause, ensuring an economic benefit to authors is of
secondary importance to the primary goal of benefiting the general public
and society by ensuring progress, although offering economic incentives to
authors is generally the best method of ensuring that creativity is
maximized. 12

11
12

/d. at 429. Furthermore, the Court in Sony highlighted the need to strike a
balance between granting exclusive rights to authors and encouraging public dissemination of creative works - goals that are at once complementary
and contradictory. ld. at 429 n.10, 429-32 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 60-2222,
at 7 (1909), and discussing a number of cases that articulate the purpose of
copyright law).
The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly ... reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest: Creative
work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of [works]
.... The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return
for an "author's" creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive,
to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good. "The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly,' this Court has said, 'lie in the general benefits derived by the public
from the labors of authors."'
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (quoting
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)). The dissent in Sony also
agreed with this formulation of the underlying purpose of the Copyright
Clause, providing one of the most concise statements on the tension created
by the Copyright Clause's authorization of limited monopolies: "The fair
use doctrine must strike a balance between the dual risks created by the
copyright system: on the one hand, that depriving authors of their monopoly will reduce their incentive to create, and, on the other, that granting
authors a complete monopoly will reduce the creative ability of others."
Sony, 464 U.S. at 479 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Pierre N. Leva!, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1086, 1109
(1990).
See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co., Inc. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 519 (2001) ("The primary
purpose of copyright is not to reward the author, but is rather to secure 'the
general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.'" (quoting
1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER oN CoPYRIGHT
§ 103[A] (2006) (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127
(1932))); Twentieth Century Music Corp., 422 U.S. at 156; see also United
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The primary limitation on the control over a work that the Framers
intended to allow Congress to extend to authors under the Copyright
Clause is the requirement that exclusive rights may only be granted for
"limited Times. " 13 This temporal limitation ensured that the public will
eventually gain access to copyrighted works, and it prompted authors to
widely distribute their works to the public before the copyright term expires.14 The Statute of Anne also recognized the value of eventual public
access. Although it was enacted for the purposes of preventing book
piracy, the Statute limited the monopoly granted to authors to twenty-one
years for existing works, and up to two fourteen-year terms for new
books. 15 This durational limit is an important limitation on the monopoly
granted by Congress under the Copyright Clause, but Congress has been
very generous to authors. It has expanded the term of copyright several
times, and the Supreme Court has never disallowed Congress' actions in
this respect. 16
Even within the durational limitations required by the Constitution,
the scope of copyright protection has never been absolute. Courts have
invoked numerous prudential doctrines that limit the rights of a copyright
holderP English courts recognized the fair use doctrine - the most significant limitation on a copyright owner's exclusive rights during the copyright's term - long before the Framers drafted the Copyright Clause.
Under the Statute of Anne, English courts held that some secondary uses
States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948); Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel.
Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
13 U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
14 See PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 6, at 52 (noting that "[copyright's]
function was to encourage the author to distribute the works he or she created."). Because copyright terms are limited, authors will naturally attempt
to reproduce and distribute their copyrighted work as widely as possible
because once the term expires, terminating the monopoly that the author
held over the work, others can reproduce the work and compete with the
author for sales. This competition will reduce the amount of revenue that
an author can generate from marketing his work in two ways: (1) the reproducer will capture a portion of the market for the work, and (2) direct competition reduces the price that may be charged for the work.
15 The Statute of Anne granted authors the exclusive rights to print or dispose of
new works for a single fourteen-year term. If the author was still alive when
that period expired, the Statute extended those rights for a second fourteenyear term. 8 Ann., c. 19 (1710) (Eng.).
16 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 193-96 (2003) (surveying and discussing
all historical expansions of the durational limit and upholding the most recent expansion).
17 See, e.g., Karen L. Still, Comment, American Geophysical Union v. Texaco,
Inc.: Expanding the Copyright Monopoly, 29 GA. L. REv. 1233, 1240-41
(1995) (discussing court-established doctrines that limit the scope of the
monopoly granted by copyright).
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of copyrighted works could be considered "fair abridgements." 18 The
Framers certainly contemplated similar limits on the rights of copyright
holders. Because the Copyright Clause authorizes Congress to extend
copyright protection "to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts," laws enacted for other purposes- including those that undermine
such progress - should fall outside of what the Framers authorized Congress to legislate.19
United States courts have always recognized that copyright protection
does not confer absolute rights on the holders of copyright, even during
the terms authorized by Congress. Although the first two omnibus Copyright Acts passed in the United States in 1790 and 1909 contained no statutory fair use provisions,2° courts consistently interpreted the statutes such
that they did not extend to every secondary use of a protected work. 21
Justice Story first explicitly infused the doctrine of fair use into U.S. common law in the 1841 case Folsom v. Marsh. 22 Story's opinion outlined several factors that the Court considered in making its determination that the
secondary use was fair: "[I]n deciding questions of this sort, look to the
nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work." 23

18 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, CoPYRIGHT LAw AND PRAcncE 6-17 (1994).
19 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) ("The
fair use doctrine ... 'permits [and requires] courts to avoid rigid application
of the copyright statute when ... it would stifle the very creativity which
that law is designed to foster."' (alteration in original) (emphasis added)
(quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)). Unfortunately, this is
not always the case, such as when the Supreme Court upheld the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
20 See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1976); Act of May 31,
1790, ch.15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1909). Congress amended the 1790 Act in
1831 and 1870, expanding the types of materials that were eligible for copyright protection. See Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (amended 1870);
Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 85-111, 16 Stat. 198, 212-17 (repealed 1909).
21 See, e.g., Richard B. Graves III, Private Rights, Public Uses, and the Future of
the Copyright Clause, 80 NEB. L. REv. 64, 95 (2001) (noting that courts applying the 1790 Copyright Act recognized the fair use doctrine).
22 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
23 Id. at 348.
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Other courts continued to apply this formulation of fair use 24 until
Congress codified the doctrine in section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act
("Act"). 25
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A,
the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include(1) The purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) The nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.
(4) The effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a
finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of
all the above factors. 26
The legislative history of the Act makes clear that Congress merely intended to codify the common law doctrine of fair use that courts already
employed. 27
24

25

26

27

See, e.g., Mathews Conveyer Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 15 F.2d 73, 84-85 (6th Cir.
1943); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144-46
S.D.N.Y. 1968); Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 256 F.
Supp. 55, 63-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); N.Y. Tribune, Inc. v. Otis & Co., 39 F.
Supp. 67, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (providing the fair use provisions of the 1976 Copyright
Act). In addition to codifying the fair use doctrine, the 1976 Act also rearticulated the rights that attach to a copyright: to reproduce the work, to
prepare derivative works, to distribute the work to the public, and to perform or display the work publicly. /d. § 106.
/d.§ 107. The last provision- that the unpublished nature of a work will not
prevent it from being used "fairly" - was enacted in 1992 in response to
the Second Circuit's decision in Salinger v. Random House, 811 F.2d 90 (2d
Cir. 1987), holding that a biographer of author J.D. Salinger could not use
Salinger's unpublished letters.
See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976); S. REP. No. 94-473, at 62 (1975); H.R.
REP. No. 90-83, at 32 (1967) (explaining the House Committee's intention
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The Supreme Court has interpreted the fair use provision of the 1976
Copyright Act several times since its enactment. In the Court's first look
at the fair use doctrine following the passage of the 1976 Act, however, it
quickly departed from the common law understanding of fair use. In Sony
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studies, Inc. ,28 the Court wrote that
"every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair
exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of copyright."29 The Sony Court cited no authority for this statement, and its
approach lasted only another decade, until Campbelt.3° In fact, the Sony
Court acknowledged, in other parts of its decision, that the common law
fair use doctrine explicitly rejected any "rigid, bright-line approach to fair
use." 31 The Court's announcement of a commercial presumption is even
more curious because it cited the Conference Report from the 1976 Act,
which pointed out that the commercial character of the work is "not conclusive," but rather one factor to be "weighed along with other[s] in fair
use decisions. "32
Less than a year after deciding Sony, the Supreme Court revisited fair
use in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises. 33 The Court
relied heavily on the commercial presumption that was articulated in
Sony, finding that a magazine article that copied parts of a manuscript of
to "restate the [common law] judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change,
narrow, or enlarge it in any way").
28 464 u.s. 417 (1984).
29 Id. at 451.
30 In 1994 the Supreme Court wrote:
The language of the statute makes clear that the commercial or nonprofit
educational purpose of a work is only one element of the first factor enquiry into its purpose and character. Section 107{1) uses the term "including" to begin the dependent clause referring to commercial use, and the
main clause speaks of a broader investigation into "purpose and character." As we explained in Harper & Row, Congress resisted attempts to
narrow the ambit of this traditional enquiry by adopting categories of
presumptively fair use, and it urged courts to preserve the breadth of
their traditionally ample view of the universe of relevant evidence. . . . If
indeed, commerciality carried presumptive force against a finding of fairness, the presumption would swallow nearly all of the illustrative uses
listed in the preamble paragraph of§ 107, including news reporting, comment, criticism, teaching, scholarship, and research, since these activities
"are generally conducted for profit in this country." Congress could not
have intended such a rule, which certainly is not inferable from the common-law cases ....
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 {1994).
31 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 n.31
(1984).
32 Id. at 449 n.32 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 {1976)).
33 471 u.s. 539 (1985).
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former President Gerald Ford's memoirs was not a fair use, in great part
because The Nation scooped a shorter article that was to appear in Time
Magazine that had been authorized by Harper & Row. 34 Here, the Court
applied Sony's commercial presumption to facts where the secondary use
involved copying only a small portion of the original work, incorporating it
into an article with original text. 35 More seriously, the Court also weighed
the fourth factor more heavily than the others, calling it "undoubtedly the
single most important element of fair use." 36 Citing Sony and other cases,
the Court wrote that the fourth factor weighed against a finding of fair use
when the secondary use harmed the actual or potential markets for the
original work - including the market for derivative works - if the allegedly infringing use were to become widespread. 37
In its 1994 decision Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,3 8 the Supreme
Court clarified how courts should examine section 107 fair use defenses.
More specifically, Campbell examined whether the band 2 Live Crew's rap
parody of Roy Orbison's Oh, Pretty Woman was a fair use. In its decision,
which will be spelled out in greater detail throughout this article, the
Court reviewed the history of fair use, and discussed extensively both Sony
and Harper & Row.
Despite the Campbell Court's intent to clarify how courts should examine a claim of fair use, lower courts continue to struggle with questions
of fair use. Especially troublesome is the fact that, more than a decade
after Campbell, some courts persist in applying the commercial presumption from Sony and in giving the fourth factor more weight than the others
(as was done in Harper & Row), despite Campbell's rejection of both of
these practices. 39 The recommendation in Section VII of this article to
34
35

36
37

38

39

/d. at 562.
/d. at 562-66. The 2,250-word infringing article copied only 300 words verbatim from the memoirs of former president Gerald Ford that totaled over
200,000 words. /d. at 542-45; see also 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 12,
§ 13.05[A][5) (discussing Harper & Row).
471 U.S. at 566.
/d. at 568 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 451; Iowa State Research Found., Inc. v.
Am. Broad. Cos, 621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d
1061, 1070 (2d Cir. 1977); Roy Export v. Columbia Broad., Inc., 503 F.
Supp. 1137, 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
510 u.s. 569 (1994}.
In Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th
Cir. 2000), the Ninth Circuit, reversing the district court, faulted it for applying "an erroneous legal standard" in its analysis of the first fair use factor. /d. at 606. The appeals court also found that the district court came to
the wrong conclusion when it held that the fourth factor favored the plaintiff. /d. at 607. Two years earlier, a Ninth Circuit panel, citing Sony, wrote
that "every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the
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revise section 107 are based, in significant part, on the errors of these
lower courts.
II.

FAIR USE ANALYSIS IN TEXACO v. AMERICAN
GEOPHYSICAL UNION

The anomalous results and inconsistent application of the statutory
fair use factors by lower courts exposes the incoherence in federal courts'
application of section 107. The Second Circuit's 1994 decision in American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc. 40 - which came right on the heels
of Campbell- is particularly poignant. In Texaco, the Second Circuit upheld the district court's ruling that the copying and archiving of journal
articles by scientists who worked for Texaco was not a fair use. 41 The
court's holding in favor of the plaintiff publisher is not as noteworthy as its
reasoning. Texaco, and several other federal appeals court cases that have
cited both it and Campbell, illustrate the difficulty many courts have interpreting and applying section 107, despite the Supreme Court's broad discussion of fair use in Campbell. The decisions also show how far copyright
jurisprudence has strayed from its early roots.

40

41

copyright." Micro Star v. Formgen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1998).
The Connectix court corrected that error in 2000, writing that "such a reading would be contrary to Acuff-Rose." 203 F.3d at 606 n.lO. Also in 1998,
the Ninth Circuit cited both Sony and Harper & Row: "While a commercial
use does not by itself preclude a defense of fair use, "every commercial use
of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright" [citations to
Sony omitted] .... Further, '[t]he crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is
... whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted
material without paying the customary price."' [citations to Harper & Row
omitted]. L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int'l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987,
994 (9th Cir. 1998). The court's statements were not corrected by later
panels. In 2004, the Sixth Circuit vacated a preliminary injunction issued
by the Eastern District of Kentucky in favor of the plaintiff for misapplying
both the first and fourth fair use factors: "With respect to the first factor ...
it is true that a profit-making purpose generally militates against a finding
of fair use. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585
(1994). But it is not the case that any profit-making purpose weighs against
fair use .... " Lexmark Int'l, Inc, v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387
F.3d 522, 544 (6th Cir. 2004). As for the fourth factor, the appellate court
wrote that the lower court "focused on the wrong market" in finding that
this factor favored the plaintiff. !d. at 545. See also Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortgage Corp., 259 F. Supp. 2d 531, 536 n.9
(N.D. Tex. 2003).
60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994). The Second Circuit issued an initial opinion in
Texaco, 37 F.3d 881 (2d Cir. 1994), which was subsequently amended when
rehearing was denied. No. 92-9341, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 36735 (2d Cir.
Dec. 23, 1994).
See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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Texaco employed a number of scientists who conducted research and
development of new products. 42 To assist these scientists, the company
subscribed to a number of scholarly scientific publications, which it maintained in an on-site library. 43 Many of these journals were circulated to
Texaco's scientists to make them aware of new developments in the
field. 44 A number of the scientists copied articles they thought might be
relevant to their current or future research. Some filed these copies in
their office - which the court referred to as "archiving" - and then
passed the issues along to other Texaco scientists. 45
American Geophysical Union publishes scientific journals. It, along
with eighty-two other publishers, sued Texaco for copyright infringement.46 Because the litigation was clearly going to turn on whether Texaco's actions were a fair use, the parties agreed that an initial trial should
occur on this issue, based on a written record. 47 To simplify the process of
creating the record, the parties also agreed to choose one Texaco scientist
to represent all Texaco scientists, and to look only at a few of the journal
articles that he copied. 48 The scientist chosen was Dr. Donald H. Chickering, who had copied, and then filed away, eight different articles from the
journal Catalysis. 49
The district court, in a comprehensive opinion written by Judge Pierre
N. Leval who oversaw a bench trial, found that "Texaco's photocopying, as
represented by Chickering's copying of these eight articles, was not fair
use under section 107 of the Copyright Act. " 50 The district court looked
to both the statutory fair use factors and "other equitable considerations. " 51 Texaco appealed to the Second Circuit, which reviewed the district court's determination de novo because "fair use is a 'mixed question
of law and fact.' " 52 The three-judge panel, with one judge dissenting, upheld the district court's decision.
The Second Circuit began its analysis of Chickering's conduct by
briefly discussing the history of fair use, noting that Congress did not provide much guidance on how courts should apply the fair use doctrine when
42

Texaco, 60 F.3d at 915.

43 !d.
!d.
See id.
46 /d. at 914-15.
47 !d.
48 /d. at 915.
49 !d.
50 /d. (discussing the district court's opinion). The district court's opinion is
found at 802 F.2d 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
51 /d.
52 /d. at 918 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 417 U.S.
539, 560 (1985)).

44
45
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photocopying is at issue. 53 It then turned to the four statutory fair use
factors. In analyzing the first factor, the court agreed with the district
court that Chickering's copying was commercial and nontransformative. 54
The court focused less than the district court did on the fact that Texaco
was a for-profit corporation, citing Campbell's explicit rejection of the
commercial presumption against fair use that emerged from Sony. 55 Although Chickering's research may have been used to develop new products that would benefit Texaco commercially, this tenuous connection
provided only very weak evidence to tip this portion of the first factor
analysis in favor of American Geophysical. 56 The majority also found that
Texaco reaped indirect economic benefits from the photocopying by not
paying royalties.57
Regarding the transformative prong of the first fair use factor - the
character of the use - the Second Circuit held that Chickering's copies
were not transformative, notwithstanding Texaco's argument that copying
the articles so as to make them easier to use in a laboratory constitutes a
transformative use. 58 The court wrote "[i]n this case, the predominant archival purpose of the copying tips the first factor against the copier, despite the benefit of a more usable format." 59 Significantly, the majority
rejected the arguments of the dissenting judge that Chickering's copies
53 /d. at 917 ("Congress has thus far provided scant guidance for resolving fair

54
55

56

57
58
59

use issues involving photocopying, legislating specifically only as to library
copying, and providing indirect advice concerning classroom copying." (internal citation omitted)).
See id. at 918-25 (analyzing Chickering's conduct, as it relates to the first
factor).
Id. at 921.
Indeed, Campbell warns against "elevating ... to a per se rule" Sony's
language about a presumption against fair use arising from commercial
use. Campbell discards that language in favor of a more subtle, sophisticated approach, which recognizes that "the more transformative the new
work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use." (internal citations
omitted).
Id. The Second Circuit wanted to be clear on this point. After writing and
publishing an initial opinion, American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc.,
37 F.3d 881 (2d Cir. 1994), it amended the decision to add the foregoing
language and to downplay the significance of the fourth factor in light of the
Supreme Court decision in Campbell. The amended opinion, and the one
cited in this article, is American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d
913 (2d Cir. 1994).
Texaco, 60 F.3d at 922.
ld.
Id. at 923.
Id. at 924.
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were transformative because they were made in the course of his
research. 60
The court distinguished Chickering's conduct from the enumerated
uses in section 107, writing that "[t]he purposes illustrated by the categories listed in section 107 refer primarily to the work of authorship alleged
to be a fair use, not to the activity in which the alleged infringer is engaged."61 Linking its analysis of the first factor to that of the fourth factor
- and focusing on the fact that Texaco's scientists made copies of the
articles and archived them, essentially creating personal libraries without
paying for additional subscriptions or license fees for additional copies the court held that the first factor weighed against a finding of fair use:
[T]he first factor favors the publishers, primarily because
the dominant purpose of the use is a systematic institutional policy of multiplying the available number of copies of pertinent
copyrighted articles by circulating the journals among employed
scientists for them to make copies, thereby serving the same purpose for which additional subscriptions are normally sold, or, as
will be discussed, for which photocopying licenses may be
obtained. 62
The Second Circuit only addressed the second factor (nature of the
work) briefly, agreeing with the district court that it favored Texaco because the factual nature of the copied journal articles placed them outside
of the core of what copyright seeks to protect. 63 The court also dealt with
the third factor (amount and substantiality) quickly, finding that it
weighed heavily against fair use because Chickering copied eight articles
in their entirety. 64 Although Texaco argued that the eight articles were
merely a fraction of the entire body of work published in Catalysis, the
court correctly noted that each individual article "was separately authored
and constitutes a discrete original work[] of authorship,"' and thus, each
was protected by its own copyright. 65
The court's analysis of the fourth factor is the most troubling. The
majority agreed with the district court that by photocopying the articles,
Texaco denied publishers revenue that they were properly owed. 66 Because Chickering copied only selected individual articles from full issues of
Catalysis, the court looked at both the negative effect of Chickering's con60
61
62
63
64

65
66

See id.
/d. (emphasis added).

Id. at
/d. at
!d.
Id. at
Id. at

924-25.
925.
926 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102).
927.
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duct on revenues generated by sales of subscriptions, back issues, and back
volumes - what the court more than once called the "traditional market"67 - and to the impact of the photocopying on revenue generated by
sales of individual articles. 68 Concluding that Chickering's copying individual articles only reduced the number of journal subscriptions by a few,
and noting "the uncertain relationship between the market for journals
and the market for and value of individual articles," the majority wrote
that "the loss of a few journal subscriptions tips the fourth factor only
slightly toward the publishers because evidence of such loss is weak evidence that the copied articles themselves have lost any value." 69
Although lost subscription sales only modestly harmed the plaintiffs,
much more significant was the loss of licensing revenues, which, the court
concluded, strongly militated against a finding of fair use.7° The court
noted that all copyright owners are "entitled to demand a royalty for licensing others to use [their) copyrighted work," 71 and so it looked to the
effect of Chickering's conduct on potential licensing revenue, tempered by
the language from Campbell indicating that it could consider only lost licensing revenue from "traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed
markets." 72
The majority wrote that "the right to seek payment for a particular
use tends to become legally cognizable under the fourth fair use factor
when the means for paying for such a use is made easier," 73 and that the
Copyright Clearance Center (CCC)74 provided an established vehicle that
allowed institutional users to obtain licenses for individual articles.7 5 To
buttress its analysis, the court cited evidence that Congress intended lost
licensing revenue to be "legally recognized as part of the potential market
for journal articles. "76
67 Id. at 927-28.
68 See id. at 927.
69 Id. at 929.
ld. at 929-31.
Id. at 929.
72 Id. at 930 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592
(1994)).
73 Id. at 929-30.
74 "The [Copyright Clearance Center, Inc.] is a central clearing-house established
in 1977 primarily by publishers to license photocopying. The CCC offers a
variety of licensing schemes; fees can be paid on a per copy basis or through
blanket license arrangements." ld. at 929 n.16. The district court described
the CCC in great detail in its opinion. See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 7-9 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
75 Texaco, 60 F.3d at 929 (describing the CCC as "a workable market for institutional users to obtain licenses for the right to produce their own copies of
individual articles via photocopying.").
76 Id. at 931.
70
71
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Judge Jacob's dissent challenged the majority on both the first and
fourth factors. Regarding the first factor, Jacobs argued that Chickering's
purpose in copying the journal articles was to provide himself with a useful, personal file of articles that assisted his research. 77 Even though
Chickering did not use all of the articles, and even though he made exact
copies of them, Jacobs found it important that Chickering did not archive
the copies to resell them, but rather he kept these "functional counterpart[s) of notes" as one step in the research process.78 Jacobs believed the
first factor favored Texaco.
As for the fourth factor, Jacobs found entirely uncompelling the argument that the publisher lost subscription revenue because of Chickering's
conduct. Noting that American Geophysical charged "double the normal
subscription rate to institutional subscribers," Jacobs found that the publisher must have expected Texaco scientists to use the journals as they did,
and that the publisher was compensated accordingly.7 9 Moreover, Texaco's conduct only denied American Geophysical the revenue from a few
subscriptions, and there was no identifiable loss of revenue from reduced
sales of individual articles or back issues. 80
As for licensing revenues, Jacobs focused on the fact that the CCC
had not matured into a viable system for charging institutional subscribers
a fee to license individual articles. 81 To Jacobs, this presumably removed
the CCC from the realm of "traditional markets" to which Campbell permits courts to look in determining whether a defendant improperly denied
licensing revenue to a plaintiff. But the greatest flaw of the majority decision, according to Jacobs, was the circular reasoning of the fourth factor/
licensing position. This issue will be dealt with in section IV of this article.
By holding that the CCC created a feasible method for obtaining licenses to individual journal articles, the Second Circuit has made it difficult for a secondary user to win the fourth factor; a plaintiff will always be
able to prove that the defendant could have paid a licensing fee, and thus,
the plaintiff lost potential revenue in the market for the copyrighted work.
Following the decision, some feared that it would set a precedent for subsequent lawsuits involving copying journal articles - this time in the nonprofit environment. But more than a decade later, that fear has been
unrealized; nearly all lawsuits have involved the private sector. 82
at 932-33 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
at 935 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
at 936 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
(Jacobs, J., dissenting).
at 937-38 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
This is not to say that the Copyright Clearance Center or its occasional partner
in litigation, the Association of American Publishers, have been quiet. Several suits were filed against copyshops (see, e.g., CCC Settles One Suit, Files

/d.
/d.
79 /d.
80 /d.
81 /d.
77

78

82
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FAIR USE ANALYSIS IN CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS
CITING CAMPBELL AND TEXACO

Concern over Texaco's precedent led the authors to examine the
dozen federal appellate court cases that have cited both Texaco and Campbell (Campbell because of its significance in clarifying - or supposedly
clarifying - how courts should examine section 107) since these two cases
were decided in 1994. Deconstructing the factors that courts use in determining whether a use is fair, we try to see if there is common ground in
those decisions such that one may predict, based on a court's findings,
whether certain uses are fair, or instead, infringing.
Our findings revealed how dysfunctionally section 107 is applied in
today's courts. Many courts appear not to understand the Supreme
Court's language in Campbell on how to analyze fair use. And as some
judges are wont to do, they pick and choose statements from earlier court
decisions that support their position, ignoring those that do not.
The following three tables present the results that various courts
reached in each case that informed the development of this article's proposal to amend the existing fair use statute. Table 1 presents the Supreme
Court's conclusions in Campbell and Texaco. The other two tables show
the conclusions of federal appellate courts in every case from 1994 through
2006 that cites both Campbell and Texaco.
Table 2 presents the results in the six cases in which the courts found
that the secondary users conduct was not fair use, while Table 3 presents
the results of the six cases where the courts found a fair use. The left-hand
column of each table lists the six factors to which courts look when making
a fair use determination under the existing fair use statute - including
whether the secondary use is a use enumerated in the preamble to section
107 - and the court's holding. The first factor, § 107(a), is split into its
two components - the purpose and character of the use. The purpose of
the use examines whether the use was non-profit, commercial, or something in between. The character of the use examines whether the use was
transformative. The cases are listed in the top row of each table, and each
cell indicates whether the court decided for the plaintiff or defendant regarding a particular factor in a particular case. When a court's conclusion
Another, PuBLISHERS WKLY., July 14, 2003, at 12; CCC Wins Copy Shop
Settlements, PuBLISHERS WKLY., Nov. 17, 2003, at 16). Several were also
against law firms: In December 2004, the CCC settled an infringement suit
it initiated against Squire Sanders & Dempsey (CCC Settles with Law Firm,
PUBLISHERS WKLY., Dec. 13,2004, at 17); Collier, Shannon & Scott: (When
a Firm Tries to Cut Corners, It is Caught in Copyright Embarrassment, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 6, 1991, at B7); and in 1999 the CCC settled its suit against
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae (Settlement Reinforces Issue of Copyright Protection, 3 PRoF. Pus. REP. (Mar. 26, 1999).

734

Journal, Copyright Society of the U.S.A.

was ambiguous or noteworthy, additional information is provided. The
remainder of the article will flesh out these tables, discussing how the
courts arrived at their findings for each fair use factor, and their holdings.
Table 1: Findings in Campbell and Texaco

American Geop"lJica/
Union v. Texaco

Enumerated Use

Campbell v. Acufi-Rost!>3
Yes85

Purpose of the Use

For Plaintiff

Neutral

Character of the Use

For Defendant

For Plaintiff

Nature of the Work

For Plaintiff

For Defendant

No

Amount and Substantiality

For Defendant

For Plaintiff

Market Effect

For Defendant

For Plaintiff

Outcome

For Defendant

For Plaintiff

Table 2: Cases Holding for the Plaintiff

On Davis v.
The Gap86

A&Mv.
Napste/'> 1

Infinity v.
Kirkwootf'> 8

Castle Rock
v. Carof 9

Ringgold
v. BET90

Princeton
v. MDS91

Enumerated
Use

No

No

No

No

No

No

Purpose of
the Use

Plaintiff

Plaintiff

Plaintiff

Plaintiff

Plaintiff

Plaintiff

Character of
the Use

Plaintiff

Plaintiff

Plaintiff

Plaintiff

Plaintiff

Plaintiff

Nature of the
Work

Plaintiff

Plaintiff

Plaintiff

Plaintiff

Plaintiff

Plaintiff

Amount and
Substantiality

Plaintiff

Plaintiff

Defendant

Plaintiff

Plaintiff

Plaintiff

Plaintiff
Plaintiff92

Plaintiff

Market Effect

Plaintiff

Plaintiff

Plaintiff

Outcome

Plaintiff

Plaintiff

Plaintiff

Plaintiff

Plaintiff

Plaintiff

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
85 The Court concluded that the parody challenged in Campbell was similar to
criticism and commentary, which are enumerated uses.
86 On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2001).
87 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
88 Infinity Broadcast Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 1998).
89 Castle Rock Entm't Group, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d
Cir. 1998).
90 Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997).
91 Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir.
1996).
92 The court held that this factor only favored the plaintiff slightly.
83
84
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Table 3: Cases Holding for tbe Defendant
NXIVMv.
Nunez v.
Ross lnst. 93 CINC94

Sony v.
Leibovitz v.
Sundeman v. B. Graham
v. DK98
Connectix95 Paramount96 Seajay 97

Enumerated
Use

Yes

Yes

No

No99

Yes

Not
addressed

Purpose of
the Use

Plaintiff100

Defendant

Defendant

Plaintiff

Defendant

Defendant

Character of Defendant
the Use

Defendant
or I
Neutra1 101

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Nature of the Plaintiff
Work

Defendant

Defendant

Plaintiff

Plaintiff

Plaintiff102

Amount and Neutral
Substantiality

Neutral

Plaintiff

Neutral

Defendant

Neutral

Market
Effect

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Outcome

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

IV.

LICENSING AND THE "CIRCULARITY" PROBLEM IN
CURRENT FAIR USE ANALYSIS

Texaco's most troubling aspect arises from what dissenting Judge Jacobs called the "circularity of the problem" - that the fourth factor's
analysis on the impact on potential licensing revenues for traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed markets for licensing that the majority
protected "will not crystallize unless courts reject the fair use argument."103 In other words, the Second Circuit's ruling that the loss of po93
94
95
96
97
98
99
10o

101

102

103

NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 482 (2d Cir. 2004).
Nunez v. Caribbean Int'l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2000).
Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000).
Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998).
Sundeman v. Seajay Soc'y, Inc., 142 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 1998).
Bill Graham Entm't v. Dorling Kinserley, Ltd., 448 F.3d 604 (2d Cir. 2006).
Unlike in Campbell, the parody at issue in Leibovitz was not considered an
enumerated use.
The Second Circuit ruled that the purpose of the use factor favored the
plaintiff in NXIVM because the copy had been obtained through the bad
faith actions of the defendant.
The First Circuit's discussion of the first factor included good faith and public
policy considerations related to news reporting, not just a traditional
analysis of whether the copy was transfonnative.
The Court found that Grateful Dead posters that were copied were creative,
but gave this factor limited weight because the defendant's purpose was to
highlight the images' historical, rather than creative, value.
Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 937 (2d Cir. 1994) (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
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tential licensing fees tipped the fourth factor for the plaintiffs was a selffulfilling prophecy.
This approach poses the danger that only uses which courts already
have determined to be fair uses under section 107 will be protected in
future cases. For example, the Supreme Court protected 2 Live Crew's
parody in Campbell, primarily because a parody is not a market substitute
under the fourth factor. 104 Had the Copyright Clearance Center or an
organization like the CCC licensed parodies before the case was decided,
Campbell may very well have come out differently. But post-Campbell,
there is no CCC-like organization that licenses parodies, and no parody
would be considered a market substitute for the license that such an entity
- were it to exist - would provide.
Suppose, however, that the Supreme Court had not heard Campbell,
and there were no decisions whether a parody was a market substitute for
the original work. The Campbell Court reasoned that an original work
and a parody of that work serve different market functions; 105 a parody,
pure and simple, does not serve as the type of market substitute for the
original work about which the fourth factor inquires. 106 Indeed, "the unlikelihood that creators of imaginative works will license critical reviews or
lampoons of their own productions removes such uses from the very notion of a potential licensing market." 107
However, if a court using Texaco's licensing analysis examined a parody in the absence of the Campbell decision, that court could find, because
artists license their work for all sorts of uses, a potential market does exist
for parodies. That Weird Al Yankovic, a well-known parodist of hit songs,
gets permission from the artists he parodies provides evidence of such a
market. 108 Absent Campbell, a court could use the rationale of Texaco
and hold that because some artists pay licensing fees, parodies are indeed
a market substitute for a potential licensing market. 109 Nothing inherent
104
105

106
107
108

109

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994).
Id. at 591.
/d.
Id. at 592.
"AI does get permission from the original writers of the songs that he parodies.
While the law supports his ability to parody without permission, he feels it's
important to maintain the relationships that he's built with artists and writers over the years." "Weird AI" Yankovic: Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.weirdal.com/faq.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2007).
The Campbell Court wrote that "[t]his distinction between potentially remediable displacement and unremediable disparagement is reflected in the rule
that there is no protectible derivative market for criticism. The market for
potential derivative uses includes only those that creators or original works
would in general develop or license others to develop." Campbell, 510 U.S.
at 592.

Pretty Woman Meets the Man Who Wears the Star

737

in fair use jurisprudence separates parodies from other uses. 110 Only parodies' current status as "fair" protects those who create them from Texaco's circular licensing analysis - an artist who can pay must pay. 111 The
risk, of course, is that uses that courts have not explicitly found to be fair
will require payment of royalties once someone starts to license them.
If a use is fair, permission is not needed. 112 Nor should a court take
into consideration the fact that a copyright owner refused to grant permission to use a work after receiving such a request,ll 3 as happened in Campbell where Acuff-Rose Music denied 2 Live Crew's offer to pay a fee for
making a parody of Oh Pretty Woman,l1 4 The fact that a particular copyright owner refuses permission does not preclude use of the work if the
use is otherwise fair, as in Campbell. Nor is a market for a work created
simply because a copyright owner denies permission.
Under current fair use analysis, courts look to whether a market exists
in which a copyright owner might license a work - a much broader inquiry than whether a specific plaintiff actually did license the work. Beyond that, courts also may consider whether a market for the work might
exist. A comparison of the language the Supreme Court used in Campbell
and what the Second Circuit used in Texaco reveals some ambiguity as to
what courts should examine.
In Campbell, the Supreme Court wrote that "[t]he market for potential derivative uses includes only those that creators of original works
would in general develop or license others to develop." 115 But in Texaco,
the Second Circuit - referring to Campbell as authority - changed the
language somewhat, writing that "courts have recognized limits on the
110

111

112
113

114
115

"Like a book review quoting from the copyrighted material criticized, parody
may or may not be a fair use, and petitioners' suggestion that any parodic
use is presumptively fair has no more justification in law or fact than the
equally hopeful claim that any use for news reporting should be presumed
fair. ... Accordingly, parody, like any other use, has to work its way
through the relevant factors, and be judged case by case, in light of the ends
of copyright law. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 581.
One court's parody may be another's satire. See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters. v.
Penguin Books, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997), where the Ninth Circuit, citing Campbell, found that The Cat Not in the Hat! A Parody by Dr. Juice was
a satire rather than a parody, notwithstanding the book's title.
"If the use is otherwise fair, then no permission need be sought or granted."
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 585 n.18.
"[W)e reject Acuff Rose's argument that 2 Live Crew's request for permission
to use the original should be weighed against a finding of fair use. Even if
good faith were central to fair use, 2 Live Crew's actions do not necessarily
suggest that they believed their version was not fair use; the offer may simply have been made in a good faith effort to avoid this litigation." /d.
Id. at 572-73.
!d. at 592.
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concept of 'potential licensing revenues' by considering only revenues for
traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed markets when examining
and assessing a secondary user's 'effect upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.' " 116 Federal district and appellate courts
have used language from Campbell and Texaco equally. 117 In either case,
that a court may find that a market exists - even though the plaintiff in
the case failed to exploit that market - certainly lessens the chance that a
use will be considered fair. 118 Although several of the cases analyzed in
this article look primarily at whether the plaintiff previously had licensed a
work, under the circular licensing analysis, once any copyright owner licenses a particular use, a licensing market exists.
Once a court finds that a particular use usurps a licensing market,
anyone who wants to use the work must ask, and probably pay, for the
privilege to use it. If the market is a mere potential market, rather than an
existing one, a ruling in favor of the plaintiff will spur the very market that
it claims the infringing use has already usurped. Some courts, therefore,
presumably to find a use fair, conclude that no market exists, especially for
well-protected purposes such as news reporting or parody. 11 9 Nonetheless, a circular licensing analysis has the potential to render every single
use that a copyright owner could license unfair, except for those uses
courts have already explicitly protected. 12o
The Texaco court - and courts citing Texaco - say they avoid this
circularity by considering only "traditional, reasonable, or likely to be de116

117

118

119

12o

Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930 (2d Cir. 1994).
Twelve courts have cited the language from Campbell, and twelve cited the
language from Texaco. Three appellate courts cited the language from both
Campbell and Texaco in discussing the fourth fair use factor: the Second
Circuit in Castle Rock Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Carol Publishing
Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998); the Sixth Circuit in Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir.
1996); and the Eleventh Circuit in SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.,
268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
See, e.g., Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 146 ("It would ... not serve the ends of the
Copyright Act - i.e., to advance the arts - if artists were denied their
monopoly over derivative versions of their creative works merely because
they made the artistic decision not to saturate those markets with variations
of their original." (internal citations omitted)).
See, e.g., Nunez v. Caribbean Int'l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 25 (1st Cir. 2000),
where the court found no market for licensing photographs of newsworthy
individuals to journalists.
The Campbell Court wrote early in its decision that parodies are not presumptively fair. 510 U.S. at 581. Later, in discussing the fourth factor, it distinguished between merely critical parodies ("parody pure and simple") for
which there are no derivative markets, and other parodies that "may have a
more complex character, with effects not only in the arena of criticism. but
also in protectible markets for derivative works, too." /d. at 592.
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veloped markets." 121 Unfortunately, a very difficult hurdle exists for defendants once any licensing regime is established. As Texaco shows,
litigation and advocacy can have startling results.
A concentrated public relations campaign and litigation by the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC) helped to create the licensing regime cited
by the Texaco court. Advocacy and litigation continued, in full force, after
the decision. The CCC and the Association of American Publishers
(AAP) strategically used Texaco to build its subscription base. In 1990two years before the Texaco trial court decision and after having existed
for thirteen years - the CCC had only slightly more than 500 subscribers;
about 400 used the CCC's ponderous "Transactional Reporting Service,"
and 110 used their much simpler "Annual Authorization Service" (AAS)
license. 122 But by the spring of 1993, only eight months after the district
court decision, there were 3,500 subscribers to the AAS alone. 123 And by
the year 2000 the CCC had more than 10,000 subscribers,124 a number that
has remained at that level to the present day_l2 5
Although the number of subscribers to the CCC increased by leaps
and bounds after the two Texaco decisions - aided and abetted by CCC's
and AAP's aggressive tactics - that is not the case for the number of
publishers and authors who are represented by the CCC. In 1990, "approximately 8,000 publishers ... had registered approximately 1.5 million
publications with CCC." 126 In 2007, the CCC reported that it "manages
the rights to over 1.75 million works and represents more than 9,600 pub121

122

123

124
125

126

Texaco, 60 F.3d at 930; see also Nunez, 235 F.3d at 25; Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at
146; Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 81 (2d Cir.
1997); Bill Graham Entm't v. Dorling Kinserley, Ltd., 448 F.3d 604,614 (2d
Cir. 2006).
"At the end of 1989, there were approximately 400 users reporting under the
TRS [the Copyright Clearance Center's "Transactional Reporting Service"].
As of September 1990, there were 110 AAS [Annual Authorization Service]
licenses, including eleven of Texaco's major petroleum company competitors and many other research-oriented companies." Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees, American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930 (2d
Cir. 1994) (No. 1479) [hereinafter AAP Brief], available at http://fairuse.
stanford.edu/primary_materials/cases/texaco/aap.html).
Kelly L. Frey, Copyright Clearance Center: A Photocopying Licensing Alternative, presentation before the Greater Philadelphia Law Library Association Institute (Mar. 12, 1993): "CCC has agreements with over 8,000
publishers and 1.5 million titles. CCC currently licenses over 3,500 U.S.
Corporations and subsidiaries on an annual basis under it's Annual Authorization Service ... including a growing number of Jaw firm libraries."
Letter from Jodi Weeks (of the CCC) to Jim Heller (Aug. 8, 2000).
Copyright Clearance Center "Corporate Overview," http://www.copyright.
corn/ccddo/viewPage?pageCode=au1 (last visited Mar. 12, 2007).
AAP Brief, supra note, 122, at 25.
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lishers ... authors, and other creators." 127 So although the number of
copyright creators and owners who use the CCC to collect royalties increased by only 20% from 1990 to 2006, and the number of works managed by the CCC grew by just over 15%, the number of users who pay
royalties through the CCC grew by 700% between 1990 and 1993 (from
about 500 to 3,500), and then nearly tripled between 1993 and 2000 (from
3,500 to 10,000). Clearly, the Texaco decision has been very lucrative for
copyright owners, for publisher organizations such as the Association of
American Publishers, and for the Copyright Clearance Center.
Subsequent to Texaco, the application of licensing analysis in court
decisions that have cited both it and Campbell shows how Texaco-style
licensing circularity favors plaintiffs. In Ringgold v. Black Entertainment
Television, 128 artist Faith Ringgold sued Black Entertainment Television
for showing a rerun of a television show that used a poster of her "Church
Picnic Story Quilt" as a set decoration. Ringgold had licensed the sale of
thousands of posters; the one on the show presumably had come, directly
or indirectly, from one such sale. 129 Nothing in the show's plot, dialogue,
or camera-work drew attention to the poster, which remained partially obscured in the background, often out of focus, and which was visible for less
than twenty-seven seconds. 130
The Second Circuit found that Ringgold demonstrated that a "traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed" market existed for her to
license her quilt as a television or film set decoration because she collected
$31,500 in 1995 from licensing her works, she is often asked to license her
works for television and films, and she had earlier denied a request from a
different television show to use a "Church Picnic" poster. 131 The only evidence on the source of that $31,500 suggested, however, that it came from
a type of licensing use (posters) different from that of the defendant (set
decoration). The court pointed to no evidence that Ringgold received
money for licensing set decorations, and, apparently, Ringgold failed to
claim that a market for licensing art as set decorations even existed; the
appellate court's only mention that such a market existed referred not to
the trial court decision or the trial court transcript, but instead to an amicus brief by the Artists Rights Society and the Picasso Administration "indicating evidence of licensing artistic works for film and television set
decoration. " 132
127
128
129
130
131
132

Copyright Clearance Center "Corporate Overview," supra note 125.
126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997).
/d. at 72.
/d. at 73.
!d. at 81.
/d. at 81 & n.15. In fact, the revenue stream typically runs the other way, with
owners paying to place their products on television shows in increasingly
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Before the Ringgold court even began its analysis of the fourth factor,
it wrote that "just as members of the public expect to pay to obtain a
painting or a poster to decorate their homes, producers of plays, films, and
television programs should generally expect to pay a license fee when they
conclude that a particular work of copyrighted art is an appropriate component of the decoration of a set." 133 The court, however, compared dissimilar . things: the producers of plays, films, and television programs
already pay for their set decorations in exactly the same fashion that
homeowners do - they buy them. They should not have to pay an additional licensing fee for each copyrighted item that is added to the background of a set. 134
The fact that a potential secondary user once asked for permission
should not serve as evidence that the market was "traditional, reasonable,
or likely to be developed," nor that the use was unfair. Such requests,
followed in some situations by a decision not to use the work when the
request is denied, may come from a desire to avoid litigation. As noted
earlier, the Supreme Court wrote in Campbell that a request for permis-.
sion to use a work does not weigh against a finding of fair use. 135
Ringgold's catch-22 seems to require a user to get permission if the
work is licensed for any type of use. If permission is denied, the user proceeds at his or her own risk, even if the use might actually be fair. Even
though a fair use does not need permission,136 every user who fears litigation, and therefore seeks permission and/or pays royalties because some
licensing regime exists, helps to create a vicious cycle: subsequent users

133
134

135

136

clever and subtle ways. See Lights, Camera, Brands, EcoNOMIST, Oct. 27,
2005.
Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 80 (2d Cir. 1997).
No mise-en-scene is safe if every individually arranged piece of taxidermy
lurking in a staged saloon set, every unique cross-stitched "Home Sweet
Home" design hanging in a television living room, and every antique glasseyed doll unearthed for the hazy background of a horror movie has a copyright owner lurking behind the scenes to license their product, and then
search for it in a play, film, or television program to demand royalties or file
an infringement suit. Arguably, potential plaintiffs would not even have to
license their works, as long as they could prove that someone somewhere
licensed similar products.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585 n.18 (1994). See also
Bill Graham Entm't v. Darling Kinserley, Ltd., 448 F.3d 604,614-15 (2d Cir.
2006).
See Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, 150 F.3d 132, 146 (2d Cir.
1998) ("If the use is otherwise fair, then no permission need be sought or
granted. . . . [B]eing denied permission to use a work does not weigh
against a finding of fair use." (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 585 n.18.)) (alteration in original).
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could have paid and should have paid, making it easier for future plaintiffs
to win an infringement lawsuit.
Ringgold is somewhat different from another Second Circuit case decided a few years later, also in favor of the plaintiff. Faith Ringold was
able to show that she had received significant revenue from licensing her
artwork, though for a very different purpose than the use that was held to
be unfair. In On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 131 plaintiff On Davis ("Davis")
had sold his work many times, but had licensed it only once - and received very modest royalties - for the same type of use that was the subject of the lawsuit against The Gap.
The opinion in On Davis was written by Judge Pierre Laval, who
nearly a decade earlier as a district court judge wrote the trial court decision in Texaco. 138 Davis created non-functional designer eyewear (sold
under the name Onoculii Designs) which he copyrighted. Without permission, The Gap used a photograph of a model wearing Onoculii eyewear in
one of its advertisements. The district court granted The Gap's motion for
summary judgment, dismissing Davis's copyright infringement claim. On
appeal, the Second Circuit reversed.
The Second Circuit was convinced that the licensing "market" for Davis's artwork was harmed, even though he had only received $50 for the
one time he licensed his eyewear. 139 On the other hand, Davis had made
roughly $10,000 dollars a year selling Onoculii eyeglasses, 140 a market
that, one might guess, could benefit from having Onoculii appear in The
Gap's advertisement.1 41
The court pointedly evaluated The Gap's fair use defense "in light of
the Supreme Court's clarification in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc .
. . . of the relationship among the four factors specified in the statute as
appropriate for consideration." 142 As for the first factor, the court found
that The Gap did not transform the Onoculii eyewear, and that the secondary use "being an advertisement, is at the outer limit of commercialism."143 It readily concluded that the second and third factors favored
Davis.
Judge Laval began his discussion of the fourth factor noting that
Campbell clarified that the dictum from The Nation "if misunderstood,
137 246 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2001 ).
138 Judge Laval was appointed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in 1977. In 1993, President Clinton appointed him
to the Second Circuit.
139 On Davis, 246 F.3d 152.
140 /d. at 157.
141 The record indicates that Davis initiated the lawsuit after asking The Gap
whether they would be interested in selling a line of his eyewear. /d.
142 /d. at 174.
143 /d. at 175.
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was capable of causing confusion." 144 Strangely- because On Davis did
not involve criticism or parody- Laval referred again to Campbell, writing that a secondary use does not produce a harm cognizable under the
Copyright Act when the harm comes "through criticism or parody, rather
than by offering a market substitute for the original that supersedes it." 145
The court had found earlier that Davis had established a fair market
value of $50 for a photo of someone wearing Onoculli in an advertisement,146 and that a copyright owner suffers damage "[i]f a copier of [sic]
protected work, instead of obtaining permission and paying the fee, proceeds without permission and without compensating the owner." 147 Writing that "[i]f ... the secondary use, by copying the first, offers itself as a
market substitute and in that fashion harms the market value of the original, this factor argues strongly against a finding of fair use," 148 the panel
concluded that:
the Gap's use is not transformative. It supersedes. By taking for
free Davis's design for its ad, the Gap avoided paying 'the customary price' Davis was entitled to charge for the use of his design .... Davis suffered market harm through his loss of the
royalty revenue to which he was reasonably entitled in the circumstances, as well as through the diminution of his opportunity
to license others who might regard Davis's design as preempted
by the Gap's ad. 149
By all appearances, the court had to stretch in vacating the district
court's granting The Gap's motion for summary judgment, and, arguably,
added to the confusion Laval cautioned about. What makes the appellate
court's decision somewhat more comprehensible is the fact that the defendants' use was for advertising - a typically disfavored use. 150
The Second Circuit panels in both Ringgold and On Davis apparently
believed that any type of licensing in commercial settings creates a market,
144

145
146
147
148
149
150

/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.

at 161.
at 165.
at 175-76.
at 176.
"The use ... of a copyrighted work to advertise a product, even in a parody,
will be entitled to less indulgence under the first factor of the fair use enquiry than the sale of a parody for its own sake. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585 (1994). "'Commercial uses' are extremely
broad. At one extreme, the defendant's use of a copyrighted work in an
advertising context is probably least likely to justify a fair use defense, even
if the plaintiffs copyrighted work, as well as the defendant's use thereof,
were both for advertising purposes." (footnote citations omitted). 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 12, § 13.05[A)[1)[c).
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an overly broad approach that contravenes the primary purpose of copyright. In Ringgold, the costs associated with licensing every copyrighted
work in a realistic set, over and above actually buying the physical items
themselves, will be prohibitive for many television, film, and theater producers. Artists making documentaries, for example, may end needing to
find thousands of dollars in tight budgets to pay to license six seconds of a
cell phone's ringtone, or the sound, as in Hoop Dreams, of the subject's
family singing Happy Birthday. 151 Aggressive copyright owners, supported by decisions like Ringgold and On Davis, themselves products of
Texaco's "can pay/should pay" reasoning, can create a licensing market for
nearly everything. And every person who pays royalties reduces the likelihood that a court will find that the fourth factor weighs in favor of fair
use.152
151 Nancy Ramsey, The Hidden Cost of Documentaries, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16,2005,
at B13. The U.S. Copyright Office has even held that ringtones are subject
to the Copyright Act's statutory license for making and distributing phonorecords. See In the Matter of Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, No. RF 2006-1, U.S. Copyright Office
(Oct. 16, 2006), 71 Fed. Reg. 64303 (Nov. 1, 2006).
152 The Sixth Circuit addressed the circular licensing conundrum in Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996).
Like Basic Books v. Kinkos Graphics, Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y.
1991), for-profit copyshop Michigan Document Services (MDS) was sued
by several publishers for making coursepacks for students at the University
of Michigan. Although the initial three-judge appellate court panel held
that MDS's actions fair under section 107, in an en bane rehearing, eight of
the thirteen judges held that MDS's actions were infringing. The majority
- like the majority in Texaco - wrote that MDS's competitors paid royalties, and that if copyshops throughout the U.S. did what MDS did, the publishers' "revenue stream would shrivel." 99 F.3d at 1387. The majority also
cited Texaco when it addressed the defendant's circularity argument:
"Where ... the copyright holder clearly does have an interest in exploiting a
licensing market - and especially where the copyright holder has actually
succeeded in doing so - 'it is appropriate that potential licensing revenues
for photocopying be considered in a fair use analysis."' 99 F.3d at 1381
(quoting Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930-31 (2d
Cir. 1994)). Not surprisingly, the dissenters took the majority to task.
"[P]laintiffs here have failed to demonstrate that the photocopying done by
defendant has caused even marginal economic harm to their publishing business. . . . Simply because the publishers have managed to make licensing
fees a significant source of income ... does not make the income from
licensing a factor on which we must rely in our analysis." 99 F.3d at 1396-97
(Merritt, J., dissenting); "The argument that the publishers seek to enter the
derivative market of customized materials by licensing MDS and other
copyshops who create such compilations, and that MDS's publication of unauthorized compilations interferes with their ability to obtain licensing fees
from other copyshops simply returns the publishers to their original circular

Pretty Woman Meets the Man Who Wears the Star

V.

745

THE TRANSFORMATIVE INQUIRY AND ENUMERATED
USES

The character of the use - whether it transforms the original work serves as only one prong of the first fair use factor, but it has become the
focus of fair use analysis, and informs the analysis of the other factors. As
the Supreme Court wrote in Campbell:
[a]lthough ... transformative use is not absolutely necessary for
a finding of fair use, the goal of copyright, to promote science
and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works. Such works thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing space within the confines of
copyright. 153
A transformative use "adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message."154 When the use of a work is transformative, the importance of its
purpose - whether commercial, nonprofit, or something in between - is
diminished. 155 As the tables in Part III show, in every appellate court
decision citing both Texaco and Campbell, if the court found the use to be
transformative, it was a fair use. Conversely, if the court found the use
non-transformative, it was infringing.
Often, however, cases in the wake of Campbell and Texaco incorporated the enumerated uses -criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research into the consideration of the character of the use, which confuses the issue
of whether the work was actually transformed. Campbell paved the way
by considering the enumerated uses within the ambit of the first factor:
"The enquiry here may be guided by the examples given in the preamble
to § 107, looking to whether the use is for criticism, or comment, or news
reporting, and the like." 156 In Campbell, the transformation stemmed directly from the enumerated use in question; parody underlay the changes
that 2 Live Crew made to Oh Pretty Woman. In other cases, although an
enumerated use did not actually transform a work, some courts nonetheless (and rather confusingly) considered it transformative.
argument that they are entitled to permission fees, in part, because they are
losing permission fees." 99 F.3d at 1408-09 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
153 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (1994).

154 !d.
155 "[T]he more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of
other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair
use." /d.
156 !d. at 578-79.
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In Nunez v. Caribbean International News Corp., 157 the plaintiff, a
professional photographer, took photographs of Joyce Giraud, Miss Puerto Rico Universe 1997, for use in her modeling portfolio, and distributed
the photos to the Puerto Rico modeling community. Controversy arose
when photos of a naked Giraud were displayed on a local television program. The defendant, newspaper EL Vocero, wrote several articles about
the controversy, and, without permission, included three of the plaintiffs
photos. 158
The First Circuit held that EL Vocero transformed the photos into
news by publishing them. 159 The photos themselves, however, were not
altered beyond the predictable decline in quality that results from transferring an 8"xl0" glossy image into a newsprint photograph. 160 News, along
with parody and the handful of uses that are listed in the preamble to
section 107, is a favored use. 161 But unlike parodies, transforming newsworthy items (here, photos) into something they are not, would, in fact,
make them less newsworthy. The Nunez panel wrote that the rather titillating, scandal-driven news story provided commentary, thereby providing
a context that altered the photographs. 162 This analysis seems a somewhat
disingenuous way to find transformation, given that in another part of the
decision the panel agreed with the district court's comment that "the pictures were the story."l63
Other defendants, however, might have a hard time relying on this
"context" analysis from Nunez. When such analysis is separated from the
issue of enumerated uses, the defendants in Nunez provided a much less
157
158
159
160
161

235 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2000).
/d. at 21.
Id. at 23.
/d. at 25.
"[T]he more informational or functional the plaintiffs work, the broader
should be the scope of the fair use defense." 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra
note 12, § 13.05 (a)(2)(a); "The scope of the fair use defense is broader
when informational works of general interest to the public are involved
than when the works are creative products." Brewer v. Hustler Magazine,
749 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1984).
162 "[W]hat is important here is that plaintiffs' photographs were originally intended to appear in modeling portfolios, not in the newspaper; the former
use, not the latter, motivated the creation of the work. Thus, by using the
photographs in conjunction with editorial commentary, El Vocero did not
merely 'supersede[] the object of the original creation[s],' but instead used
the works for 'a further purpose,' giving them a new meaning, or message.
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 .... It is this transformation of the works into
news - and not the mere newsworthiness of the works themselves - that
weighs in favor of fair use under the first factor of sec. 107." Nunez v. Caribbean Int'l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2000).
163 Id. at 22.
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transformative context than did many other defendants who lost the transformative portion of the first fair use factor. The panel itself noted that
the photos were put on the cover of El Vocero to stimulate sales, not for
the sole purpose of commenting on them.l 64
Nunez raises a challenging issue as to when a copyrighted work's context in a news publication transforms it into news. Certainly the mere appearance of a work within a newspaper does not transform it into news.
For example, a Dr. Seuss story is not "transformed" when it is republished
verbatim in the children's section of a newspaper. Sometimes, however, as
the court held in Nunez, the photograph or the work is itself the newsworthy subject. When such a work is used without the copyright owner's
permission, courts can reasonably require that the work be used as news.
To illustrate this point, consider the following scenarios.
A defendant newspaper uses a photographer's 8x10 nude photo of a
beauty queen, and prints it to fill most of the first page of the newspaper.
Any text about its significance is run on the second page or beneath the
fold. In this case, the newspaper would be using the photograph in the
same way that Playboy would: as a nude photo, and not as news.
Contrast this with a case where the newspaper photo is shrunk to a
size significantly smaller than the original, appears beneath a headline, and
is surrounded by textual commentary. Even though the news may still be
salacious, the news story replaces the aesthetic thrust of the photograph
itself as the primary focus and use.
A newspaper has a license from a cartoonist to publish his editorial
cartoons. One cartoon depicts the .prophet Mohammed sitting on a missile. Another newspaper reprints the cartoon, without permission, in the
space it reserves for its daily editorial cartoons. A !though the cartoon is a
commentary on culture, religion and society, it acquires no new meaning
or message compared to the original.
On the other hand, if the cartoon sparks protests, another newspaper
might print it as part of a news story, making it clear that the purpose of
reprinting the cartoon illustrates its story about the impact of the cartoon's
content, not a mere repetition of the original content and meaning. In this
case, reprinting the cartoon is critical to understanding why the cartoon is
now "news."
Headlines and text are not the only ways in which a work may be
transformed into news. For example, if a controversy arises regarding the
reprinting of the cartoon itself - if the cartoonist claims infringement a newspaper might print it with no textual commentary and no headline,
transforming the cartoon by drawing a red circle with a line through it, or
164

"The photographs were used in part to create an enticing lead page that would
prompt readers to purchase the newspaper." !d.
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by stamping the word "CENSORED" across it. These changes, even if
they do not impair the ability to see the original work, alter the message.
In this case, the use is one of those enumerated in the preamble to section
107 - commentary on the lawsuit.
In many cases, original works serve the same functions as the enumerated uses, such as news reporting, criticism, and commentary. Such works
may be the subject of further enumerated uses themselves; today we see
parodies of parodies, and news reporting on news reporting as newspaper
ombudsmen and others attempt to make the media more transparent or to
analyze it. 165 Accordingly, in the arena of enumerated uses and transformation specifically, courts should consider whether a work has been reprinted in a second source to merely recreate it, or, instead, in a way that
qualifies as a true secondary enumerated use - such as news reporting that relies on the original message, but also sends a new one, through context, which truly transforms the original's message.
But courts have held that even drastic changes of context, such as
changing dialogue from a television show into trivia questions in a book,
do not constitute transformation. 166 In Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v.
Carol Publishing Group, Inc., the Second Circuit placed heavy emphasis
on the first fair use factor in holding that the use of program dialogue in
The Seinfeld Aptitude Test (The SAT), a trivia book, was not a fair use. 167
The SAT included 643 trivia questions drawn from 84 out of 86
Seinfeld episodes that had been aired as of the time the book was published.168 Rather than examine the infringement claim as to each individual episode, the court treated the entire series as a single work. 169 After
concluding that The SAT infringed copyrighted expression from the programs, the court addressed the fair use defense, hinting, in language taken
from Campbell that it might hold in favor of the defendant.
"From the infancy of copyright protection," the fair use defense
"has been thought necessary to fulfill copyright's very purpose,
'[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.' ... Every
book in literature, science and art borrows, and must necessarily
165 For example, the commentary on the controversy over Dan Rather's 60 Minutes piece about President Bush's service in the Texas National Guard: Online Focus: Eye of the Storm, a NewsHour with Jim Lehrer (Sept. 16, 2004),
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/media/july-dec04/cbs_9-16.html. See generally Howard Kurtz's Media Notes columns in the Washington Post.
166 Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, 150 F.3d 132, 142-43 (2d Cir.
1998).
167 /d. at 146.
168 /d. at 135.
169 /d. at 138.
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borrow, and use much which was well known and used before."
IdJ70

But this was not to be.
As for the first element of the first factor, the court wrote that the
commerciality of the use was not very important. The court cited Campbell for its observation that "'nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in the
preamble of§ 107 .... are generally conducted for profit in this country,'
[citations omitted] .... We therefore do not give much weight to the fact
that the secondary use was for commercial gain." 171
The panel called the second element the more critical inquiry, and
referring to the preamble wrote: "we find scant reason to conclude that
this trivia quiz book seeks to educate, criticize, parody, comment, report
upon, or research Seinfeld, or otherwise serve a transformative purpose."172 The court also commented on the confusion in copyright jurisprudence between derivative works and transformative works,
distinguishing between derivative works that merely transform an original
work into a new mode of presentation and remain under control of the
copyright owner, and those that have a transformative purpose and qualify
as a fair use. 173
The Second Circuit's conclusion that The SAT was not transformative
proved fatal to the defendants when the court turned its analysis to the
other three fair use factors, as this determination drove those subsequent
findings. As for the nature of the use, the court wrote that "the fictional
nature of the copyrighted work remains significant in the instant case,
where the secondary use is at best minimally transformative." 174
When it examined the amount and substantiality used, the court
noted that, under Campbell, the inquiry focuses on whether the extent of
no ld. at 141 (internal citations to Campbell omitted).
171 Id. at 142. Compare A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc, 239 F.3d 1005, 1015
(9th Cir. 2001) ("Direct economic benefit is not required to demonstrate a
commercial use. Rather, repeated and exploitative copying of copyrighted
works, even if the copies are not offered for sale, may constitute a commercial use." The Ninth Circuit, citing Texaco, wrote that commercial use was
shown by Napster's users not having to buy CD's because they were getting
music for free using Napster's MusicShare software. The circuit court, with
some modifications, affirmed the district court's injunction against Napster
as a contributory infringer because it facilitated transmission of MP3 files
between and among its users through peer-to-peer file sharing, 239 F.3d at
1019. Unlike the personal time-shifting that was permitted in the
"Betamax" case, Napster involved the distribution of copyrighted music to
the general public.).
172 /d. at 142-43.
173 /d. at 143.
174 ld. at 144.
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the copying is consistent with or more than necessary to further the purpose and character of the use.17 5 It also quoted Texaco: "[B]y focusing
[sic] on the amount and substantiality of the original work used by the
secondary user, we gain insight into the purpose and character of the use
as we consider whether the quantity of the material used was reasonable in
relation to the purpose of the copying." 176 Having earlier found that The
SAT's purpose was entertainment and not commentary, it served no critical or otherwise transformative purpose, and, therefore, the third factor
weighed against fair use. 177
Campbell also came into play in the fourth factor, with the Second
Circuit writing that its analysis of that factor "must also 'take account ...
of harm to the market for derivative works,' ... defined as those markets
that creators of original works would in general develop or license others
to develop.' (citations omitted)" 178 Even though there was no evidence
that Castle Rock intended to market Seinfeld trivia books, the court found
that the fourth factor favored the plaintiff.
As shown in both Castle Rock and Ringold, transformations of context and form do not make a secondary use an enumerated use. In Ringgold, the Second Circuit did not consider that any new message or
meaning might have emerged when a copyrighted artwork was briefly
shown, out of focus, in the background of a television show as part of a
mise-en-scene. By denying that the defendant's use had any transformative properties, the court did not engage in any discussion other than to
define "transformative" and to note that "the defendants' use of Ringgold's work to decorate the set for their television episode is not remotely
similar to any of the [enumerated uses]." 179 As clearly evidenced by the
Second Circuit, for some courts, "context" in the inquiry about the character of the use seems like nothing more than a pretext to inquire about
. enumerated uses, even where some contexts may truly transform. 180
175

176
177
178
179
180

!d.
!d. (citing Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 926 (2d Cir.
1994)).
!d.
!d. at 145.
Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 78 (2d Cir. 1997).
See also Mattei v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003)
(holding that transforming three-dimensional dolls into two-dimensional
photographs was transformative). But in On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., the
Second Circuit found nothing of the sort when three-dimensional eyewear
became a minor part of a two-dimensional photograph. The Second Circuit
could have found that the change to a two-dimensional poster helped the
defendant, but it did not do so. The primary difference between the two
cases - which always is of great importance in a fair use analysis - is that
Mattei dealt with parody and social satire, while On Davis dealt with
advertising.
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Examining both transformative and enumerated uses came to the
forefront in the most recent decision citing both Campbell and Texaco,
also from the Second Circuit. In Bill Graham Archives v. Darling Kindersley, Ltd., 181 the court held that using significantly reduced-in-size concert
posters in a biography of the Grateful Dead was a fair use. The panel
found that the first factor favored the defendant publishers (DK) as to
both purpose and character. 1 8 2 As we have seen before, that the use was
transformative informed the court's conclusions on the other factors.
Although the second factor favored Bill Graham because the posters
were creative, citing Campbell, the court gave it limited weight because a
creative work was used for a transformative purpose. The court wrote that
its third factor inquiry should take into account whether the amount taken
was necessary for the purpose and character of the use. 183 It found that
this factor favored DK because copying entire works "is sometimes necessary to make a fair use of the image." 184
As for the fourth factor, the court needed to meet the licensing issue
head on, for Bill Graham argued that the publisher interfered with an established market for licensing its images. 185 The court also had to overcome three important facts: that DK had paid fees to other copyright
owners to include their images in the biography, that DK initially contacted Bill Graham Archives to negotiate a license agreement, and that
although the parties could not agree on the fee, DK nevertheless proceeded to use images without permission.
In holding that the Bill Graham Archives was not harmed, the panel
found support in the enumerated uses listed in section 107's preamble, as
well as its earlier determination that DK's use was transformative. First,
the court wrote that Bill Graham's licensing market was not harmed
merely because DK did not pay a fee for the images. Citing Texaco, the
court needed to "look at the impact on potential licensing revenues for
'traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed markets."' 186
The panel found that Bill Graham failed to show "impairment to a
traditional, as opposed to a transformative market. " 1 8 7 Distinguishing
Texaco, it found that "the use of the images in the biography 'was transformatively different from their original expressive purpose. In a case
181
182
183

184
185
186
187

448 F.3d 605 {2d Cir. 2006).
Id. at 608-12.
"The third-factor inquiry must take into account the 'extent of the permissible
copying varies with the purpose and character of the use."' Id. at 613 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586-87 {1994)). ·
Id.
Id. at 614.
Id. (citing Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930 (2d Cir.
1994)).
Jd.
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such as this, a copyright holder cannot prevent others from entering fair
use markets merely 'by developing or licensing a market for parody, news
reporting, educational or other transformative uses of its own creative
work ... [C]opyright owners may not preempt exploitation of transformative markets ... .' "188 It concluded that because DK's use of the images
fell within a transformative market, Bill Graham did not suffer market
harm due to its loss of license fees.
As the most recent decision that cited both Campbell and Texaco and one in which the Second Circuit had to address Texaco's licensing reasoning head on - users of copyrighted works may find some comfort in
the Bill Graham decision. Bringing the enumerated uses into the fourth
factor inquiry, the court wrote that a copyright owner cannot, through a
licensing regime, carve out the entire market for secondary uses - especially the uses listed in the preamble.
There is danger, however, in treating the transformative inquiry as the
equivalent of an examination of enumerated uses. First, genuinely transformative works that do not qualify as enumerated uses could lose the
highly important transformative prong. Second, enumerated uses that are
indisputably non-transformative, such as multiple copies for classroom
use, might not receive the protection already given by Congress.l 89 Contradictory results will necessarily arise: a shift in medium from a glossy
image to a newsprint photograph was transformative in Nunez, 190 but the
brief, blurry, background appearance of a poster in the television show in
188
189

190

Id. at 614-15 (citing Castle Rock Entm't v. Carol Publ'g Group, 150 F.3d 132,
146 n.ll (2d Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted)).
Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir.
1996) shows how different judges on the same circuit approach this issue.
Like Basic Books v. Kinkos Graphics, Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y.
1991), copyshop MDS was sued by several publishers for making coursepacks for students at the University of Michigan. Although the initial
three-judge appellate court panel held that a for-profit company's making
coursepacks was a fair use, in an en bane rehearing, eight of the thirteen
judges held that MDS's actions were infringing. In analyzing the first factor, four of the five dissenting judges focused on the ultimate users - students and faculty - rather than on the copyshop: "The copying done in this
case is permissible under the plain language of the copyright statute that
allows 'multiple copies for classroom use,' " (99 F.3d. at 1395 Merritt, dissenting, joined by Daughtrey and Moore), and "there is no occasion to address the transformative aspect because that inquiry is not conducted at all
in the case of multiple copies for classroom use." 99 F.3d at 1400 (Ryan
dissenting, joined by Doughtrey). By contrast, the majority focused on
MDS's activities, rejecting the defendant's argument that the copying was a
non-profit educational use. It also called the copying non-transformative,
and, citing both Sony and Campbell, presumed that the plaintiffs were
harmed when it looked at the fourth fair use factor. 99 F.3d at 1385-86.
Nunez v. Caribbean Int'l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 2000).
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Ringgold was not. 191 Using complete (though significantly reduced in
size) images in a biography was a fair use in Bill Graham, but using dialogue from a television show in a trivia book in Castle Rock was not. Unpredictable results will create a chilling effect for those who contemplate
uses that may very well further the purpose of copyright, but which are not
actually enumerated.
VI.

INTERMEDIATE COPYING

The creation of some secondary works involves multiple stages.
When this happens, courts inevitably must choose which stage to consider
when analyzing whether the first work was transformed. But intermediate
uses are inappropriate targets for the transformative inquiry: when a defendant copies for a clearly enumerated use, such as the scholarly criticism
at issue in Sundeman v. Seajay Society, 192 the defendant should be permitted to make complete copies of the copyrighted work.
In Sundeman, the defendant Seajay Society purchased an unpublished
manuscript of deceased Pultizer Prize-winning novelist Marjorie Kinnan
Rawlings. 193 As part of its nonprofit purpose of enhancing awareness of
and interest in unduly neglected aspects of South Carolinian and Southern
culture, the Seajay Society made one complete photocopy and one partial
photocopy of the unpublished manuscript of Rawling's novel, Blood of My
Blood.l 94 The complete copy was given to Dr. Anne Blythe so she could
analyze it and mark it up without harming the original manuscript. 195 The
partial copy went to the University of Florida Library's Rare Book Room.
Access to this copy was restricted, and further copying forbidden, so that
the author's survivors might authenticate it and the University determine
whether it was worthy of publication. 196
In its analysis, the court looked at both the intermediate copying (the
complete copy given to Blythe and the partial copy to the University), and
the final product, Blythe's critical analysis of Blood of My Blood. The
court noted making the complete and partial copies enabled Blythe and
the University to accomplish their purposes, and also that the copying
avoided the risk of harming the irreplaceable original manuscript. In holding for the defendant, the court recognized the copying as transformative,
although it focused on the fact that the transformation occurred through
scholarship, comment, and criticism- all enumerated uses. 197
191
192
193
194
195

Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 78-79 (2d Cir. 1997).
142 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 1998).
/d. at 198-99.
/d. at 199.
/d.

196

/d.
/d. at 202-03.
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Although the appellate court cited Texaco, it did so only for authority
that its review of the district court decision was de novo. 1 98 This is surprising; of the dozen cases that cited both Campbell and Texaco, Sundeman's
facts are closest to Texaco's, in that in both cases the defendant made complete copies of print works. Sundeman, of course, did not have to contend
with Texaco's CCC licensing regime, and in Sundeman, the defendant actually used the photocopies, rather than filing them away for future use as
did Dr. Chickering.
In NXIVM v. The Ross Institute, 199 the Second Circuit could have, but
did not, comment on intermediate copying that presumably took place in a
case involving the unauthorized publication of parts of a proprietary
course manual protected both by copyright and a non-disclosure agreement. NXIVM, which presented business training seminars, provided the
course manual to those who attended its "Executive Success" program.
The program attracted the attention of Richard Ross's "Ross Institute," a
for-profit organization that engaged in cult de-programming. 200 Ross obtained a manual from someone who had attended an NXIVM program,
commissioned two reports critical of NXIVM that quoted sections from
the manual, and published the reports on the Institute's Web sites. It
seems likely that either Ross, or the authors of the reports he commissioned, copied NXIVM's manual.
The Second Circuit in NXIVM began its analysis of the first factor by
looking at the preamble. Citing Wright v. Warner Books, /nc., 201 the court
wrote "there is a strong presumption that factor one favors the defendant
if the allegedly infringing work fits the description of uses described in
§ 107." 202 Even though the defendants exercised bad faith in how they got
their hands on the manual,2°3 they won the first factor "in light of the
transformative nature of the secondary use as criticism."2 0 4
The second factor worked against the Ross Institute because the manual was unpublished.zos Regarding the third factor, the court cited Texaco
to focus its analysis on whether the amount used was reasonable in relation to the purpose of the copying. Apparently the appeals court agreed
with the district court in finding that this factor favored neither the plainId. at 201.
364 F.3d 471 (2d Cir. 2004).
2oo /d. at 475.
2o1 953 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1991).
202 364 F.3d at 477 (citing Wright, 953 F.2d at 736). Texaco, NXIVM, and Sundeman all cited Wright for this same point.
203 The defendants either knew that the seminar attendee who gave them the
manual did it without authorization, or in violation of the law. NXIVM, 364
F.3d at 478.
204 Id. at 479.
20s Id. at 480.
198
199
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tiff nor the defendant, even though it wrote that it was reasonable for the
Ross Institute to quote liberally from the manual, and as such, "the third
factor does not favor plaintiffs." 206 The fourth factor, the court concluded,
weighed heavily in favor of the defendants because the transformative criticism was not a market substitute for the original manual. 207 Weighing all
the factors, the court held that the Ross Institute's use was fair.
In many cases - especially those involving new technologies such as
Sony v. Connectix (discussed below), but also in others involving traditional print works as in Sundeman v. The Seajay Society - creating a
transformative work requires, as an interim step, copying the original.
NXIVM did not claim infringement with regard to the intermediate copies; it sued for trademark disparagement, for interference with contractual
relations, and for infringement for posting portions of the manual on the
Ross Institute's Web site.2os
Intermediate copying issues could have been raised in Texaco had Dr.
Chickering actually produced something transformative from the articles
he copied. But he did not. 209 The Second Circuit noted that "spontaneous" copying, such as to protect the original if a copy needed to be
brought into the lab, would have favored Texaco.210 The closest the court
came to addressing Chickering's copying as an intermediate step in the
process of creating something new was its quoting the district court, with
which it agreed, that the transformative factor may have weighed for the
defendants if Chickering had made another copy "for marking with
scratch notes." 211
The Texaco holding is best read narrowly, then, for its exact context
- where the copies made are not used in the process of creating a new
transformative work, such as a journal article, a research report, or a critical study. Had Chickering marked up the copies as an intermediate step
to create something new, the transformative factor might have come out
differently. 212 And because the finding on that factor illuminates the
other factors, Texaco probably would have prevailed in its fair use defense.
206
207
2os
209
210
211
212

/d. at 481.
/d. at 481-82.

Id. at 476.

Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 919 (2d Cir. 1994).
/d.
/d. at 920 n.6.

Timing clearly is important. Texaco's fair use defense failed because Chickering had done nothing with the copies. Although Chickering may have intended to use them in the process of creating something transformative, he
had not done so. Liability might be found in any intermediate copying situation if the plaintiff sues at the right time - before the defendant creates a
transformative work.
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Courts deal with technology quite differently, recognizing that intermediate copies that are created as a part of the process of transforming
the original work, rather than as an end in themselves, should not be the
focus of a fair use inquiry. In Sony Computer Entertainment v. Connectix,213 the defendant developed software that emulated the Sony PlayStation so that PlayStation games could be played on different computers. To
create its software, Connectix copied Sony's copyrighted basic input-output system (BIOS) software during a reverse engineering process that
helped Connectix figure out how the PlayStation worked. 214 Connectix
loaded Sony's BIOS into their own computers, and ran it repeatedly so
that its engineers could develop software that interacted with Sony's
BIOS. After creating its own software, Connectix developed their own
BIOS to interact with its software. The Ninth Circuit held that Connectix's
intermediate copying and use of Sony's BIOS to access the unprotected
elements of Sony's software was a fair use. 215
The Ninth Circuit began its fair use analysis with the second factor,
the nature of the copyrighted work. The panel specifically noted that
copyright did not protect the "functional" aspects of a software program,
which were presumably decoded through Connectix's reverse engineering,
and noted that computer software presented a "unique problem" in copyright, in terms of the idea/expression dichotomy. 216 It then cited Campbell
for the principle that "some works are closer to the core of intended copyright protection than others," and Sega v. Accolade as authority for giving
Sony's BIOS a "lower degree of protection than more traditional literary
works." 217 Although the court found that the third factor (the amount
used) favored Sony because Connectix copied Sony's BIOS numerous
times, it gave this factor very little weight "in a case of intermediate infringement when the final product [Connectix's software] does not itself
contain infringing material. " 218
As for the first factor, the panel's decision illustrates many courts'
confusion with post-Campbell fair use analyses. The court began its discussion by noting that the district court applied the wrong standard when
it held that "Connectix's commercial purpose in copying the Sony BIOS
gave rise to a 'presumption of unfairness that ... can be rebutted by the

213
214
21s
21 6
217
218

203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000).
/d. at 599-601.
/d. at 602.
/d. at 603.
/d. (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 569 (1994); Sega
v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510, 1526 (9th Cir. 2002)).
/d. at 606.
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characteristics of a particular commercial use."' 219 The appeals court took
the district court to task, noting that Campbell, decided several years earlier, had rejected such a presumption.220 Having clarified the proper standard, the panel found that Connectix's copying for a commercial purpose
was a separate factor tending to weigh against fair use. 221
The panel also found Connectix's Virtual Game Station "modestly
transformative." 222 To complete its finding on the first factor, citing
Campbell, the court weighed the extent of the transformation "against the
significance of other factors, including commercialism, that militate against
fair use." 223 Here, the court entered the intermediate use arena, writing
that because Connectix's commercial use of Sony's copyrighted software
was an intermediate use, it was only "indirect and derivative. "224 Focusing
on the intermediate use, the panel found that reverse engineering was a
legitimate purpose, and that the first factor favored Connectix.
The court held that the fourth factor also favored Connectix, notwithstanding the fact that Sony suffered some economic loss. Because the Virtual Game Station was transformative, it did not merely supplant the
PlayStation, but instead was a legitimate competitor. 225 Having won all
but the amount and substantiality (which, as noted above, the panel discounted because the final product, the Virtual Game Station, did not itself
contain infringing material) the court held that Connectix's use was fair.
Unlike Connectix, Texaco dealt with nothing more technologically advanced than a photocopier. (Placing Texaco in the twenty-first century by
substituting a scanner and a folder on Dr. Chickering's computer for a
photocopier and a file cabinet will not change the analysis.) Notwithstanding cases like NXWM and Sony, with Texaco's endorsement of CCC's licensing regime and the "can pay/should pay" philosophy, courts may feel
comfortable attacking copying or scanning under the first factor, even
when they occur as intermediate uses toward the creation of ultimately
transformative works. In the absence of other court decisions, the threat
of litigation will impair one's inclination to copy articles or book chapters,
even when such copying leads to writing commentary or criticism that lie
at the heart of the kind of works that the fair use doctrine should protect.
219
220

221
222
223
224
225

/d. (citing the district court decision, Sony Computer Entm't v. Connectix, 48

F. Supp. 2d 1212 (N.D. Cal. 1999)).
The Ninth Circuit also cited Texaco here as authority for "rejecting, on
grounds of Acuff-Rose and collected cases, presumption of unfairness for
commercial use as applied to Texaco's intermediate copying of copyrighted
articles." /d. at n.lO.
/d.
/d.
/d. at 607.

/d. (citing Sega v. Accolade, 977 F.2d at 1522).
/d.
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REVISING SECTION 107

To address the numerous problems courts have in interpreting the
current fair use statute, the authors propose a revised section 107, which
we will call R107. Although R107 attempts to eliminate the circularity
problem that tipped the balance against fair use in several cases, including
the Second Circuit's decisions in Texaco, Ringgold, and On Davis, it also
addresses other problems courts have had interpreting and applying the
current fair use statute. In Revised Section 107, deletions to existing§ 107
are striskea, and additions are italicized.
Revised Section 107Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the
fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified
by that section for purposes sush as sritisism, sommeat, aews
reportiag, teashing (iasluaiag multiple sopies for slassroom use),
ssholarship, or researsh, is not aa iafrmgemeat of sopyright is
not an infringement of copyright. The overarching consideration
in determining whether a use is fair is whether such use promotes
the progress of the arts and sciences.
(a) In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use, uses for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, are favored; other factors to be considered shall include:
(1) The purpose ana character of the use, final work,
including whether sush use is of a sommersial nature or
is for noaprofit eausatioaal purposes; it substitutes for
the original work, or instead transforms the original
work with new expression, meaning, or message;
(2) The nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) The amount and substantiality significance of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole, including whether the amount taken is necessary
to achieve a legitimate purpose.
(b) The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a
finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration
of all the above factors.
(c) The fact that a work is licensed shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of
all the above factors.
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(d) The fact that a work is copied in its entirety as an intermediate step shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
A.

Revised Section i07, the Fourth Fair Use Factor, and Licensing

Revised § 107 will lead courts away from a consideration of potential
harm to licensing markets and concomitant loss of licensing revenue to the
plaintiff as they decide questions of fair use. R107 eliminates the fourth
factor in the existing statute: whether the secondary use harms the market
for the original work. Courts interpret this factor inconsistently - sometimes in a manner contrary to express direction from the Supreme Court
- and create enormous hurdles for defendants who claim that their uses
are fair. 226
The ultimate goal of copyright should inform how courts make decisions regarding fair use, and R107 highlights this overarching consideration in its preamble. Courts have long recognized that harm is not always
cognizable just because a secondary work reduces the value of the original
work,Z27 and a court that does properly interpret the existing fourth factor
will inquire whether the secondary use usurped the market for the original
work.228
Copyright does not protect the owner when a secondary user causes a
reduction of the original's market share by criticizing the work or providing a distinct, alternative product. Although a scathing book review might
reprint some text from the reviewed book and reduce its number of sales,
such harm is not of the type that copyright law seeks to prevent. Conversely, if a reviewer reprints such a significant amount of the original
226 In the Michigan Document Services copyshop case, the Sixth Circuit, citing
Texaco, wrote that it was uncertain whether the final factor retained its status as the most important of the four factors, as the Supreme Court had
written in the 1985 Nation case involving the Ford memoirs. 99 F.3d at
1385. Writing that "the Supreme Court may now have abandoned the idea
that the fourth factor is of paramount importance," it nonetheless described
that factor "is at least primus inter pares," and examined it first (rather than
last) when it began examining the four statutory factors.
227 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591-92 (1994). The federal
circuit courts have cited this language from Campbell several times. See
NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 482 (2d Cir. 2004); On Davis v.
The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 175-76 (2d Cir. 2001); Castle Rock Entm't
Group, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 145 (2d Cir. 1998);
Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 114 (2d Cir. 1998); see
also SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1274 (11th Cir.
2001); Sony Computer Entm't Am. Inc. v. Bleem, LLC, 214 F.3d 1022,1029
(9th Cir. 2000).
228 See, e.g., Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l, Inc., 292 F.3d 512, 517-19 (7th Cir. 2002).
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book that readers would be able to read the review instead of the original
book - and more than is necessary to convey the reviewer's message then the use would usurp the share of the market that rightfully belongs to
the original author. But when the review undermines the market for the
original book merely by its criticism - and does not include more from
the original work than was necessary to achieve the purpose of the review
- the harm caused is not of the type that copyright law seeks to prevent.
A proper interpretation of the fourth factor seeks to permit complementary uses (such as book reviews or commentaries), but not market
substitutes.
Concern that eliminating the fourth factor unfairly favors the defendant in an infringement suit is misplaced; R107 tips the fair use balance
against market substitutes, while protecting complementary uses. A secondary use that transforms the original work is unlikely to function as a
market substitute. Because it is a different work than the original, consumers who would purchase the original would not be likely to purchase the
secondary work instead of it.
Moreover, a secondary work that does not take a significant portion
of the original work - and only what is needed to achieve a legitimate
purpose - is unlikely to be a market substitute. Exclusion of the existing
fourth factor from the proposed statute does not render market substitutes
fair. Elimination of the existing fourth factor does, however, remove the
factor upon which the Second Circuit relied in Texaco when making its
problematic determination that loss of licensing revenue tipped the fair
use balance against fair use.
If there is any doubt regarding the licensing conundrum - the circularity problem in Texaco - R107 states explicitly that "The fact that a
work is licensed shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is
made upon consideration of [the factors listed in subsection (a)]." This
clause makes clear that courts should not use loss of licensing revenue as a
dispositive factor in the fair use analysis. Just because the copyright owner
licenses his or her work does not mean that they have a monopoly over
every use so licensed.
B.

Revised Section 107 and Character of the Use

Revised section 107 also addresses the problems that have emerged in
current jurisprudence regarding the "character of the use" inquiry whether the secondary use transformed the protected work. Given the
important, and frequently dispositive, nature of this analysis, it is troubling
that courts have increasingly coupled this inquiry with a determination of
whether a secondary use is one of the favored uses enumerated in the
preamble of existing section 107.
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Infinity Broadcasting Corp. v. Kirkwood,2 29 did not involve copying,
but rather, retransmission of radio programs broadcast by the plaintiff.
Defendant Kirkwood owned Media Dial-Up, a system that enabled its
customers, who lived anywhere in the U.S., to listen to radio broadcasts
originating in various cities.230 The Second Circuit, finding that all four
factors favored Infinity, reversed the district court's holding that the use
was fair.
The panel began its discussion with the preamble. Citing both Campbell and Ringgold in writing that "the illustrative nature of the categories
should not be ignored," 231 the court noted that the defendant's retransmissions fell into none of the categories. Proceeding with its examination
of the four fair use factors, the panel found for Infinity on both the purpose and character prongs of the first factor.
Although it agreed with the district court that Kirkwood's purpose
was different than Infinity's - Kirkwood used the broadcasts to inform,
while Infinity used them to entertain - the appellate court wrote that
"difference in purpose is not quite the same as transformation, and Campbell instructs that transformativeness is the critical inquiry under this factor."232 Again citing Campbell, the court wrote "the more transformative
the work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against fair use." 233 The panel found that Kirkwood's
retransmissions did not transform the original broadcasts, and quoted
Pierre Leval's "frequently-cited article on fair use, [that] a use of copyrighted material that 'merely repackages or republishes the original' is unlikely to be deemed a fair use. " 234
Take a step back to Campbell, where the Supreme Court reversed the
Sixth Circuit's holding that 2 Live Crew's parody was not a fair use, despite the fact that it had a commercial purpose. In the context of the facts
of that case, the Supreme Court discounted the importance of commercialism because first, parody is one of the favored uses noted in the preamble
(comment and criticism), and second, a parody is transformative.
The blurring of the transformative and enumerated purpose inquiries
has occurred as courts have looked at the context in which the secondary
use operates. Some courts (Ringgold, and, perhaps, Bill Graham) have
decided that an alleged infringing use is considered transformative because it is an enumerated use, while others (Nunez and Castle Rock) have
229 150 F.32 104 (2d Cir. 1998).
230 !d. at 106.
231 !d. (citing Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 78 (2d Cir.
1997) (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577)).
232 !d. at 108.
233 !d. (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579).
234 !d. (citing Leva!, supra note 11, at 1111).
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held that a secondary use is not transformative - even if the change of
context from the original is drastic - when the secondary use is not enumerated. When genuinely transformative works lose the heavily emphasized character factor, the result is the chilling of the creation of works
that, although not serving one of the enumerated purposes, do promote
the progress of the arts and sciences.
R107 alleviates this problem in several ways. First, R107 lists the enumerated uses of existing section 107, and indicates that such uses are favored. Second, the language "other factors to be considered shall include"
(the three numbered factors character of the final work, nature of the use,
and amount and significance used) makes clear the distinction between the
favored enumerated uses and these three factors. By decoupling these inquiries, users will be better able to gauge whether their use is likely to be
fair: an enumerated use is favored, even if is are not necessarily transformative, and a transformative use will win the first factor, even if it is not
enumerated.
Additionally, the preamble to R107 explicitly states that the ultimate,
driving inquiry in making a fair use determination is whether the secondary use promotes the progress of the arts and sciences. Secondary uses
that are enumerated and/or transformative can serve this function, even if
the particular use in question is not both an enumerated use and
transformative.
Finally, R107 includes a new provision that helps to prevent the blurring of the character and enumerated use inquiries. Subpart (d) permits
entire, non-transformative copies to be deemed fair if they are made as an
intermediate step - a step that is taken prior to the completion of the
final secondary work, as took place in Sony v. Connectix. 235 In Connectix,
the defendant software developer had to make an entire copy of the
Sony's computer code to reverse engineer it in order to create the secondary product, which was an entirely different set of computer code. 236
In Texaco, the court found that Dr. Chickering copied, and then
archived, journal articles. The factual record did not show that Chickering
actually used the photocopies in conducting research for Texaco - an intermediate use - and then transform them into something else, such as a
research report. Had Chickering done so, then under Rl07 his copying
would likely have been protected, and the fact that the articles were licensed would not have barred a finding of fair use.
By making clear that intermediate copies should not be considered in
conducting a fair use analysis, revised section 107 eliminates the problems
that arise when some courts look to the initial instance of copying, while
235
236

203 F.3d 596, 606 (9th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 601, 606.
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others look to the final product. By explicitly permitting intermediate
copies if the final product justifies the taking as a fair use, a court can focus
on why a defendant copied the original work, helping it to get to the heart
of the fair use analysis: whether the use tends to promote progress in the
arts and sciences.
C.

Revised Section 107 and the Amount and Substantiality of the Use

The third factor of R107 is similar to the third factor in existing section 107 - how much of the copyrighted work was used in the secondary
work, and how significant that material is to the original work? R107,
however, substitutes "the amount and significance of the portion used" for
"the amount and substantiality of the portion used," making clear that a
court's determination of whether the third factor weighs for or against fair
use is determined by three separate inquiries.
When analyzing the third factor of existing section 107, courts are to
evaluate the amount copied in relation to the original copyrighted work,
not to the infringing work. 237 Some courts have evidenced confusion with
this aspect of the third factor, even acknowledging that although section
107 directs them to look at the amount used in relation to the work it was
copied from, they also may look at the amount taken in relation to the
infringing work. 238 Revised section 107 makes clear what court should
look at, and also clarifies other parts of the third factor inquiry.
First, under R107 courts must look at how much of the original work
was taken for use in the secondary work - the quantitative prong of the
third factor. This is a factual inquiry that can generally be expressed as a
percentage - X percent of the copyrighted material was taken. There is
no bright-line rule that indicates how much of a copyrighted work may be
fairly taken, and courts have held that copying an infinitesimal amount
may be unfair when the portion taken is an important part of the original
work. 239 Conversely, as in Sony, copying an entire work may be fair.
237

238

239

See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 417 U.S. 539, 56466 (1985); Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 630
(9th Cir. 2003); Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm't, Inc., 342
F.3d 191, 201 (3d Cir. 2003); Castle Rock Entm't Group, Inc. v. Carol
Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 144 (2d Cir. 1998).
"The language of section 107 does not direct us to examine factor three in
relation to the infringing work. However, because our precedents have applied this gloss to factor three, and because this perspective gives an added
dimension to the fair use inquiry, we too briefly consider the amount and
substantiality of the protected passages in relation to the work accused of
infringement." Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 739 (2d Cir.
1991).
See, e.g., Harper & Row, 417 U.S. at 565-66 (taking 300-400 words from a
200,000-word manuscript deemed unfair); Salinger v. Random House, Inc.,
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Courts must look at the significance of the portion of the copyrighted
work that was taken- the qualitative prong of the third factor. 240 The
word "significance" in the proposed statute replaces the word "substantiality" to clarify that courts should not confuse the inquiry under the second prong as one that looks to the quantity of the copyrighted work used
in a secondary work.
Every secondary use can be placed into one of four categories that
can help guide courts' third factor analyses. Regarding the "amount"
used, the defendant will have taken either a large amount of the original
work, or not. Regarding the "significance" prong, the defendant will have
either taken an important part of the copyrighted work, or not. If the
defendant took a substantial amount of the original work, and that portion
is significant to the original work, then the third factor will generally weigh
against fair use. On the other hand, if the defendant took only a small
portion of the original work that was not the heart of that work, the third
factor will generally weigh in favor of fair use.
In the other two cases - when the defendant takes a lot of the original work, but not the heart, or when the defendant took a small amount of
the original work, but it was a very significant portion - the result of the
third factor analysis should be guided by the third (and the most important) prong of the third factor- whether the amount and significance of
the portion taken was necessary to achieve the secondary uses proper
purpose.
The ultimate goal of copyright is to promote the progress of the arts
and sciences, and the law should protect uses that alter the original work
by infusing it with a new meaning or message. Accordingly, secondary
uses that incorporate only the portion of the original work that is necessary to achieve their proper purposes should be deemed fair.Z 41 As the
Supreme Court noted in Campbell, a parody must copy enough of the

240
241

811 F.2d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 1987) (copying 10% deemed unfair); Craft v.
Kobler, 667 F. Supp. 120, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (copying 3% deemed unfair);
cf, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
(1984) (copying 100% deemed fair); Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d
1067, 1078 (6th Cir. 1992) (copying three passages deemed fair); Wright, 953
F.2d at 738 (copying 1% deemed fair); Maxtone-Graham v. Burchaell, 803
F.2d 1253, 1263 (2d Cir. 1986) (copying 4.3% deemed fair).
See, e.g., Harper & Row, 417 U.S. at 564-66; Elvis Presley Enters., 349 F.3d at
630; Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d at 201.
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586-89 (1994); see also
Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d at 201.
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original work - often the most significant portions of it - to conjure up
the original.242
Courts should be careful, however, to avoid making a third factor
judgment based solely on their conclusion as to whether a secondary work
is transformative. The fact that a work is transformative does not necessarily mean that it did not copy a large or important part of the original
work. Moreover, some works may not transform the original work, even
though they use only a small or insignificant portion of the original. Although a court's analysis of the third factor may include looking to
whether the secondary work transformed the original, its finding on the
third factor is not dependant on how it found on the "character" factor,
and the two inquiries should be kept separate.

D.

Revised Section 107 and the Purpose of the Use

R107 does away with the first prong of the first factor of existing section 107- the purpose of the use. Typically, courts examine whether the
use is for-profit, non-profit, or something in between. In Campbell, the
Supreme Court spent considerable time criticizing the Sixth Circuit's analysis of this factor.Z 43 The Court pointed out early in Campbell the relationship between the purpose and character portions of the first factor:
"the more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of
the other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of
fair use." 244 The Court took more wind out of the "commercial uses are
evil" sails:
[A]s we explained in Harper & Row, Sony stands for the
proposition that the "fact that a publication was commercial as
opposed to nonprofit is a separate factor that tends to weigh
against a finding of fair use." [citations omitted]. But that is all,
and the fact that even the force of that tendency will vary with
the context is a further reason against elevating commerciality to
hard presumptive significance.245
242

243

244
245

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588. See also SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.,
268 F.3d 1257, 1273 (11th Cir. 2001) (involving the publication of The Wind
Done Gone).
"The Court of Appeals, however, immediately cut short the enquiry into 2
Live Crew's fair use claim by confining its treatment of the first factor essentially to one relevant fact, the commercial nature of the use. The court
then inflated the significance of this fact by applying a presumption ostensibly culled from Sony, that 'every commercial use of copyrighted material is
presumptively ... unfair ... .' Sony, 464 U.S. at 451. ... In giving virtually
dispositive weight to the commercial nature of the parody, the Court of
Appeals erred." 510 U.S. at 583-84.
510 U.S. at 579.
Id. at 585.
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The Campbell Court did not totally discount the purpose portion.
But it did note that in Sony it called for a "sensitive balancing of interests," that Congress "eschewed a bright line approach to fair use," and
that "the commercial or nonprofit educational character of a work is 'not
conclusive.' " 246
The Second Circuit, in a decision written by Judge Newman (the author of Texaco), visited parody in 1998 in Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures,
Corp. 247 In this case, photographer Annie Leibovitz sought an injunction
against an advertisement that parodied her famous Vanity Fair photo of a
pregnant Demi Moore. Paramount commissioned another photographer
to take a photo of another woman that "resembled in meticulous detail the
one taken by Leibovitz" 248 for use in an advertisement for the film Naked
Gun 33 1/3: The Final Insult. Actor Leslie Neilsen's face was digitally superimposed on the model's body in the photo, with the caption "DUE
THIS MARCH" promoting the film. The court ultimately held that the
use was fair, even though the copying was done to advertise a product. 249
The panel wrote that Campbell "illuminated the proper application of
the first fair use factor," 250 and that a post-Campbell fair use analysis
should focus on the character - or transformative - portion of the first
factor. The court quickly found the ad to be transformative. 251 But then,
the court apparently felt it necessary to inquire "whether Paramount's advertisement 'may reasonably be perceived' as a new work that 'at least in
part, comments on' Leibovitz's photograph." 252 It was not enough to find
the ad transformative; there had to be more.
Although other courts have incorporated the enumerated uses in consideration of the character of the use (transformation), in Leibovitz we see
the Second Circuit doing this even though it had already concluded that
the ad was transformative. Judge Newman wrote that for parody to reach
the level of comment and criticism favored under the statute, it needed to
ridicule the original. Apparently parody and transformation were not
enough; the ad had to be tested against the preamble. The panel ulti246

247
248
249

250
251
252

/d. at 584-85 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 455 n.40, 449 n.3, 448-49). The Court
noted that "nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in the preamble paragraph of § 107 ... 'are generally conducted for profit in this country."'
(citation to Harper & Row omitted).
137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998).
/d. at 111.
"(T]he use of a copyrighted work to advertise a product is a context entitling
the copying work to 'less indulgence' than if it is marketed for its own
worth." /d. at 113 (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 585).
/d. at 112.
"Plainly the ad adds something new and qualifies as a 'transformative' work."
/d. at 114.
Id. at 114 (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 582, 580).
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mately found that Leslie Nielsen's smirking face did meet that test. 25 3
Having found that the ad made "a parodic comment on the original," the
court, "after making some discount for the fact that it promotes a commercial product," 254 concluded that the first factor strongly favored the
defendant.
After finding that the second factor (nature of the work copied) favored the plaintiff, and that the third (amount and substantiality) apparently was neutral,2 55 the court turned to the fourth factor. In this brief
(but nonetheless confusing) segment of the decision, Newman began by
writing that "Leibovitz all but concedes that the Paramount photograph
did not interfere with any potential market for her photograph or for derivate works based upon it." 256 But then he wrote that Leibovitz's "only
argument for actual market harm is that [Paramount] deprived her of a
licensing fee." 257 The panel made short shrift of this argument (notably
arriving at a result very different from Newman's Texaco decision), writing
that Leibovitz was not entitled to a licensing fee for a work that otherwise
qualifies as a fair use.258
Leibovitz may be a case that one would have preferred not to have
seen how the sausage was made. 259 The court seemed to know that it
wanted to find the parodic advertisement a fair use, but its journey was
sometimes tortuous. Perhaps its most meaningful consequence - at least
for the authors of this article - is in providing further ammunition to do
away with the "purpose" portion of the first factor. 260
253 "Because the smirking face of Nielsen contrasts so strikingly with the serious
expression on the face of Moore, the ad may reasonably be perceived as
commenting on the seriousness, even the pretentiousness, of the original.
The contrast achieves the effect of ridicule that the Court recognized in
Campbell would serve as sufficient 'comment' to tip the first factor in a
parodist's favor." /d. (citing 510 U.S. at 583).
254 /d. at 115.
255 /d. at 115-16.
256 /d. at 116.
257 /d.
258 /d.
259 The comment that one ought not see how legislation and sausage are made has
been attributed to Otto von Bismarck, to Mark Twain, and presumably to
many others.
260 The Ninth Circuit's decision in Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books, 109
F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997), illustrates some of the difficulties that come with
the conflation of enumerated uses and transformation when analyzing the
first fair use factor. Here, the appeals court reviewed the district court's
preliminary injunction prohibiting publication and distribution of The Cat
Not in the Hat! A Parody by Dr. Juice, which told the story of the O.J.
Simpson murder trial borrowing the unique language and style of the famous Dr. Seuss book. The court wrote "[w]hile this inquiry does not specify
which purpose might render a given use 'fair,' the preamble to § 107 pro-
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VIII.

CONCLUSION

We should not be surprised to see muddled, confusing, and inconsistent decisions interpreting the fair use exemption. When Congress drafted
the Copyright Act of 1976, it acknowledged the impossibility of defining
fair use. The House Judiciary Committee wrote the following: "Although
the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use doctrine over and
over again, no real definition of the concept ever emerged. Indeed, since
the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the question must be decided on its
own facts." 261
The dozen circuit court cases that have cited both Campbell and Texaco between 1997 and 2006 prove true the Judiciary Committee's statements that codifying fair use in the 1976 Act would not end common law
ambiguity and lack of predictability.
The statement of the fair use doctrine in section 107 offers
some guidance to users in determining when the principles of the
doctrine apply. However, the endless variety of situations and
combinations of circumstances that can arise in particular cases
precludes the formulation of exact rules in the statute .... Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and
some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to
adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case
basis. 262
The freedom courts have adapting fair use on a case-by-case basisand the resulting jumbled fair use jurisprudence - makes it difficult for
many users of copyrighted works to determine if they must receive permission or pay royalties, or instead, if the use is fair. Such ambiguity has a
chilling effect on users, particularly when there exists some type of licensing regime. After thirty years, it is time to amend section 107 so that it
achieves the purpose of copyright - a balance between the rights of creators and those of users that promotes the progress of science and the arts.

261
262

vides an illustrative, though not limitative, listing .... Under this factor, the
inquiry is whether The Cat NOT in the Hat! Merely supersedes the Dr.
Seuss creations, or whether and to what extent the new work is 'transformative,' i.e., altering The Cat in the Hat with new expression, meaning or message." ld. at 1399. The court found that the defendant's book mimicked
Dr. Seuss' style but did not hold his style up to ridicule, and therefore it was
a satire rather than a parody. And "[b]ecause there is no effort to create a
transformative work with 'new expression, meaning, or message,' the infringing work's commercial use further cuts against the fair use defense."
ld. at 1401.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976).
Id. at 66.
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Now a Senior Judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Ronald Reagan appointee James L. Ryan wrote eloquently on the
purpose of copyright in his dissent in Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc.
The guiding principle of the Copyright Act is that the financial earnings of original works be channeled exclusively to the
creators of the works insofar - and only insofar - as they are
necessary to motivate the creation of original works and do not
excessively impede the advancement of science and the arts
through the public dissemination of knowledge, research, scholarship, news-reporting, teaching, criticism, and the like. 263
The authors are not sanguine that Revised Section 107 will solve all of
the problems with twenty-first century fair use jurisprudence, or even
many of them. But it does attempt to reflect what appellate court judges
have written when they attempt to achieve a fair and optimal balance between the rights of those who create copyrighted works, and the benefits
to society from the use of such works.

263

99 F.3d 1381 at 1409 (Ryan, J., dissenting).

